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TWOHIG V. BLACKMER: NEW MEXICO'S BROAD
PROTECTION FOR TRIAL PARTICIPANT SPEECH AND
THE HURDLES TO CROSS BEFORE IMPOSING
GAG ORDERS
DENISE M. CHANEZ"
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, high profile cases like the O.J. Simpson murder trial,1 the Kobe
Bryant rape case, 2 the Scott Peterson murder trial,3 and the Michael Jackson child
molestation case4 have generated extensive media coverage of criminal proceed-

ings. Courts have had to adjust to the amplified publicity associated with these high
profile cases by taking steps to ensure a fair trial for the defendant in each case.6 As
a result, courts have turned to gag orders directed at trial participants in an effort to
control pretrial publicity.' While gag orders directed at the media are almost never
upheld,' courts consider it less offensive to impose restrictions on trial participant
speech. 9

New Mexico is not immune from trial publicity in high profile cases. In one of
the most publicized cases in New Mexico history, Gordon House was prosecuted
three times on vehicular homicide charges for driving drunk and killing a mother
and her three daughters on Christmas Eve in 1992.1" Each trial resulted in extensive
media coverage." In an effort to control the publicity for House's third trial on
* Class of 2006, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Norman Bay
for his tremendous guidance and support. Also, special thanks to Amanda Sanchez and Kelly Waterfall for their
contributions to this Note.
1. See Alan Abrahmson, News Groups Seek to Lift Simpson Trial Gag Order,L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 31,1996.
2. See Associated Press, Judge Loosens Gag Order in Bryant Case, Aug. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id= 13882 (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
3. See Henry K. Lee, Judge Issues Gag Order in PetersonMurder Case, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 2003.
4. See William Overend, After Late Arrival, Jackson Pleads Not Guilty to Charges, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2004.
5. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too: Why Gag Orderson Trial
ParticipantsAreAlmostAlways Unconstitutional, 17 LOy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 311 (1997) (discussing the effect of
increasing media coverage on high profile cases).
6. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-58 (1966) (holding that the trial court is responsible for
controlling trial publicity).
7. Chemerinsky, supranote 5, at 311.
8. Id. at 328 (arguing that "from a practical perspective," the U.S. Supreme Court in Nebraska PressAss 'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), created an "absolute ban" on prior restraints on the media).
9. Ashley Gauthier, Gag Orders and the Effect on Newsgathering,Reporter's Committee for Freedom of
the Press, availableat http://rcfp.org/secretjustice/gagorders/effect.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2005). Trial participant
speech is speech by those "participat[ing] in the litigation," as opposed to the media, who are considered "strangers
to it." United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415,425 (5th Cir. 2000); accord,e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030,
1072-73 (1991); News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1512-13 & n.16 (11th Cir. 1991). Trial
participants include attorneys involved in the litigation, the accused, witnesses, and court staff. See Brown, 218 F.3d
at 425.
10. See State v. House, 1999-NMSC-014, j 1-21, 978 P.2d 967, 972-75. Another example of heavy trial
publicity in New Mexico stems from a riot at the state penitentiary in Santa Fe in February 1980. State ex rel. N.M.
Press Ass'n v. Kaufman, 98 N.M. 261, 266, 648 P.2d 300, 305 (1982). The case drew both local and national
pretrial publicity, and at least one of the criminal trials arising out of the riot resulted in a gag order. Id. The New
Mexico Supreme Court struck down the gag order in Kaufman. Id. at 306; see infra text accompanying notes
144-153.
11. Twohig v. Blackmer, 1996-NMSC-023, 2, 918 P.2d 332, 333. The first two trials resulted in mistrials
on vehicular homicide charges. Id. T1 7-8, 918 P.2d at 334.
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vehicular homicide charges, District Judge James F. Blackmer issued a gag order
prohibiting all participants in the case from talking to the news media.' 2 The New
Mexico Supreme Court struck down the gag order in Twohig v. Blackner,13 and in
doing so provided broad protection for trial participant speech in New Mexico. 4
This Note emphasizes that the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Twohig
created a high burden that must be overcome before a judge may impose a gag order
on trial participants. 5 This Note also contends that the court in Twohig properly
characterized the gag order as a prior restraint, thus raising the burden that must be
met before placing a gag order on trial participants.' 6 In addition, this Note discusses
the different standards for regulating attorney speech in pending cases, concluding
that the "clear and present danger" standard is more appropriate than the "reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice" standard when addressing free speech rights. 7
This Note concludes by questioning the necessity of placing gag orders on defense
attorneys and raises the question of whether New Mexico's free speech provision
provides greater protection than does the U.S. Constitution. 8
II. BACKGROUND
In dealing with cases involving trial publicity, the U.S. Supreme Court has
adhered to the "principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence."' 9 The
Court has described the press as "the handmaiden of effective judicial administration... guard[ing] against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."2
While the Court has recognized the importance of the media's role in the judicial
system, the competing interests of the right to free speech, embodied in the First
Amendment, 2' and the right to a fair trial, secured by the Sixth Amendment,22 create
tension when the news media covers court proceedings.23 Gag orders,24 an example

12. Id. 10, 918 P.2d at 335.
13. 1996-NMSC-023, 918 P.2d 332.
14. Id. 1, 918 P.2d at 333.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part V.A.
17. See infra Parts i1E, V.B.
18. See infra Part VI.A-B.
19. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966).
20. Id. at 350.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.").
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury.").
23. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) ("The authors of the Bill of Rights did not
undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior
to the other.").
24. A gag order is a "judge's order directing parties, attorneys, witnesses, or journalists to refrain from
publicly discussing the facts of a case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 700 (8th ed. 2004). There are two types of gag
orders: gag orders directed at the press and gag orders directed at trial participants. DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA
LAW 413 (2000). A gag order directed at the press is considered to be a form of prior restraint. Neb. PressAss "n,
427 U.S. at 556-59; see infra note 25 (defining prior restraint). The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether
gag orders directed at trial participants are prior restraints. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 314-16; see infra Part H.B.
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of a prior restraint on speech,25 are viewed by some judges as a means to control
pretrial publicity and ensure a fair trial.2 6
A. The Birth of the Gag Order
The trend toward imposing gag orders grew out of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Sheppardv. Maxwell,27 where the Court found that it is the trial judge's
responsibility to ensure the fairness of the trial and to control publicity about the
case.2 8 Sheppardinvolved a defendant accused of bludgeoning his pregnant wife to
30
death in 1954.29 The case received intense and pervasive prejudicial publicity. The
Court held that the accused in a criminal trial is entitled to an impartial jury "free
from outside influences."'', The Court directed trial courts to "take strong measures
to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused., 32 Justice Clark
wrote the opinion, criticizing the trial judge for not taking action to control the
prejudicial pretrial publicity.33 The Court went on to say that the "cure" to prevent
prejudice involves remedial measures and stated that courts "must take such steps
by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court
staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be
permitted to frustrate its function."34 This language, although dicta, is often cited as
the "authorization for indirect gag orders"35 against trial participants.3 6

25. A prior restraint is "[a] governmental restriction on speech or publication before its actual expression.
Prior restraints violate the First Amendment unless the speech is obscene, is defamatory, or creates a clear and
present danger to society." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1232 (8th ed. 2004). Temporary restraining orders and
permanent injunctions that forbid speech activities are examples of prior restraint. Alexander v. United States, 509
U.S. 544, 550 (1993). Gag orders are another example of a prior restraint. Neb. Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 556-59.
There are some exceptions to the doctrine that prior restraints violate the First Amendment, including, but not
limited to, prior restraints during war time and prior restraints against obscene publications and "incitements to acts
of violence." Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (193 1). However, these exceptions are "recognized
only in exceptional cases." Id. at 716. Prior restraints are the "most serious and the least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights," Neb. PressAss 'n, 427 U.S. at 559, and they carry a "heavy presumption against [their]
constitutional validity." Id. at 558 (quoting Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); see infra notes 267-304 and accompanying text.
26. PEMBER, supra note 24, at 413.
27. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
28. Id.at 357-63; see PEMBER, supra note 24, at 411-14; C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERNG AND
THE LAW 241 (1997).

29. Sheppard,384 U.S. at 335-37.
30. Id. at 356.
31. Id. at 362.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 357-62. Justice Clark listed multiple devices that the trial judge could have employed to control
some of the pretrial publicity. For example, the trial judge should have "adopted stricter rules governing the use of
the courtroom by newsmen"; "more closely regulated the conduct of newsmen in the courtroom"; "insulated the
witnesses"; "made some effort to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers,
witnesses, and the counsel for both sides"; "warned the newspapers to check the accuracy of their accounts";
"proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial
matters"; "requested the appropriate city and county officials to promulgate a regulation with respect to
dissemination of information about the case by their employees"; and finally, the court could have "warned
[reporters] as to the impropriety of publishing material not introduced in the proceedings." Id.
34. Id. at 363.
35. Sheryl A. Bjork, Comment, Indirect Gag Orders and the Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 165, 175 (1989).
36. Indirect gag orders are gag orders that "do not directly restrain the media's right- to publish." Id. at
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B. The Rise of Gag Orders Directedat Trial Participants
After the Court's decision'in Sheppard,judges began to use gag orders as a way
to control prejudicial pretrial publicity. 37 Judges increasingly began to impose gag
orders on the media, as well as on attorneys.38 The Court's decision in Nebraska
PressAss 'nv. Stuart3 9 came ten years after Sheppardand specifically addressed the
constitutional validity of a gag order on the media.'
Nebraska PressAss 'n involved a murder trial for a defendant accused of killing
six members of a family in their home in a small town in Nebraska.4 In evaluating
the validity of the gag order, the Court handed down a three-prong test to determine
whether a prior restraint on publication was justified.4 2 In theory, the Court did not
ban gag orders directed at the media.43 However, in practice, courts have viewed
Nebraska PressAss 'nas a prohibition on gag orders directed at the media."
The language of the Court in Nebraska Press Ass "ndemonstrates the Court's
disfavored view of prior restraints on the news media and why the Nebraska Press
Ass 'n test is so difficult to meet.45 The Court described a prior restraint as "one of
the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence."4' 6 The Court made it
clear that "even pervasive, adverse publicity" does not mean that the defendant
cannot obtain a fair trial. 47 The Court added that "[a]ny prior restraint on expression
comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity."'
In addition, the Court held that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." 49
The Court in Nebraska PressAss 'n held that parties seeking to impose a prior
restraint on the press, such as a gag order, carry a heavy burden of demonstrating the
justification for such prior restraint.50 The Court listed several other alternatives that

167-68. Instead, indirect gag orders "restrain the extrajudicial speech of trial participants" and hinder the news
media's efforts to obtain information. Id. at 168.
37. PEMBER, supra note 24, at 413.
38. DIENES, supra note 28, at 26-27, 252.
39. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
40. Id. at 541.
41. Id. at 542.
42. Id. at 562. The first inquiry under the Court's test is to determine "the nature and extent of pretrial news
coverage." Id. Next, the inquiry turns to "whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of
unrestrained pretrial publicity." Id. The analysis ends by determining "how effectively a restraining order would
operate to prevent the threatened danger." Id.
43. Id. at 570 ("[T]he guarantees of freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition under all
circumstances, but the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption against its use continues intact.").
44. See Chemerinsky, supranote 5,at328 ("[L]Uower courts have t'eatcd Aebraska Press as t=.,,-mcat to

an absolute prohibition on such prior restraints, consistently refusing to permit orders limiting press coverage of
judicial proceedings.") (quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8-4 (1994)).
45. See id.
46. Neb. PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 562.
47. Id. at 554.
48. Id. at 558 (quoting Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
49. Id. at 559.
50. Id. at 558 (citing Carroll,393 U.S. at 181; Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70). In Nebraska PressAss'n, the
court struck down the gag order imposed on the press, holding that the trial court had not met this burden to justify
imposing a prior restraint. Id. at 570.
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courts may use as opposed to a prior restraint." These alternatives include: (1)
change of venue, (2) postponement of trial until public attention subsides, (3)
extensive voir dire, (4) use of emphatic and clear instructions, and (5) sequestration
of jurors.52
Following the Supreme Court's decision in NebraskaPress Ass 'n, the use of gag
53
orders directed at the media to control pretrial publicity has largely diminished.
Instead, the trend since Nebraska Press Ass 'n has been to direct gag orders at the
trial participants themselves, thereby preventing parties, lawyers, witnesses, jurors,
law enforcement, and sometimes courthouse personnel from talking to the media
about the case. 54 Rather than preventing the media from publishing or broadcasting
certain information about a case, courts now prevent the sources of that information
from talking to the media.55 This limits the sources of information to which the
media can turn. 56 The theory is that, "[i]f the press has nothing to report, it can't
publicize prejudicial material." 57
C. Cases Upholding Gag Orders
There are many cases across jurisdictions both upholding and striking down gag
orders directed at trial participants.5 " A court's decision whether to uphold or strike
down a trial participant gag order depends largely on whether there is a sufficient
factual record to support the gag order.59 For example, in Levine v. United States
DistrictCourt,6° the Ninth Circuit held that it was appropriate to issue a gag order,
finding that there was a sufficient factual foundation to justify a gag order for the
protection of fair adjudication. 6'
The facts of Levine involved a gag order imposed on government and defense

attorneys in a case involving espionage. 62 The case received widespread local and
national publicity, which led the judge to grant the prosecution's motion for a gag
order.63 On appeal, the defense attorneys argued that the record did not contain

51. Id.at563-64.
52. Id.
53. DIENES, supranote 28, at 241.
54. Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 312; Bjork, supra note 35, at 174; Rene L. Todd, Note, A Prior
Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial
Participants,88 MICH. L. REv. 1171, 1176 (1990).
55. PEMBER, supranote 24, at 419.
56. DIENEs, supranote 28, at 241-42.
57. PEMBER, supranote 24, at 419.
58. CompareLevine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding gag order), and United
States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969) (upholding gag order), with Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (striking down gag order), Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637 (Haw. 1992) (striking down gag
order), andKemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327 (IlL 1986) (striking down gag order).
59. See Twohig v. Blackmer, 1996-NMSC-023, 11, 918 P.2d 332, 335. Gag orders are implemented based
on the specific facts of each case. See PEMBER, supra note 24, at 414.
60. 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 600-01. The trial court ordered "that all attorneys.. shall not make any statements to members of
case that bears upon the merits to be resolved by the jury." Id. at 593.
the news media concerning any aspect of this
Ultimately, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the language in the gag order, "upon the merits to be resolved by
the jury," was overbroad. Id.at 598-99. The court in Levine found that "many statements that bear 'upon the merits
to be resolved by the jury' present no danger to the administration of justice." Id. at 599.
62. Id. at 591-93.
63. Id. at 593. The prosecution asked for the gag order after the defense attorneys spoke with the Los Angeles
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sufficient facts to support the district court's findings that a gag order was
necessary. 64 However, the Ninth Circuit took into account that the defense attorneys
made statements to the media about the prosecution's case immediately before or
during the trial, creating a greater chance for prejudice. 65 The court in Levine found
that the "circus-like environment" created by high profile trials "threatens the
integrity of the judicial system. ' '67 The Ninth Circuit declared that the press did not
have the right to hear the case argued prior to the court.68
Similarly, in United States v. Tierina,69 the Tenth Circuit concluded that a gag
order was appropriate because there was a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the
trial and jurors.7 ° The challenge to the gag order arose after two defendants were
held in contempt for making public statements about the case at a convention.71 The
Tenth Circuit determined that statements made by the defendants while the trial was
pending jeopardized a fair trial.72 The court stated, "The guarantee of a public trial
means a public trial in the courthouse, not in a convention hall."73
D. Cases Striking Down Gag Orders
The lack of specific factual findings to support imposing a gag order can cause
a court to strike down a trial participant gag order.7 4 For example, in Chase v.
Robson,75 the Seventh Circuit held that a pretrial order that prevented the attorneys
and defendants from talking publicly about the case was unconstitutional.76 The key
factor in the Seventh Circuit's decision to invalidate the gag order was the

Times shortly before the trial began. Id. The defense attorneys discussed their case in detail and attacked the
prosecution's case. Id. at 592-93. The defense attorneys alleged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
exaggerated evidence against their client and misled the U.S. Attorney's office about the strength of the case. Id.
at 592. They also claimed that their client admitted to passing documents only after five days of questioning and
after he told the investigators that he would say anything to stop the interrogation. Id.
64. Id. at 598.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 597 (citing the trial court's findings). The court in Levine considered other alternatives but
determined that they were not satisfactory to deal with the pretrial publicity generated by the case. Id. at 599-600.
The Ninth Circuit considered alternatives to a gag order, such as searching voir dire, "emphatic and clear" jury
instructions, change of venue or postponement, and jury sequestration. Id.
69. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969).
70. Id. at 666. The trial judge implemented the gag order after the defense counsel suggested it as a way to
deal with the pretrial publicity. Id. at 662-63. The gag order prohibited attorneys, defendants, and witnesses from
making any public statements (written or oral) at public meetings or for public reporting about jurors, evidence, the
merits of the case, witnesses, and court rulings. Id.at 663.
71. Id. at 663-66. One defendant told a large crowd at the convention that he 'told the witnesses what to say
and what to do," that the trial judge was "using the law to take vengeance," and that he was going to advise people
to "march around the court house." Id. at 665. A co-defendant stated that the United States was going to try to "put
[them] to death." Id.
72. Id. at 666.
73. Id. at 667.
74. See, e.g., Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637,
640 (Haw. 1992); Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327 (1l.
1986).
75. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
76. Id. at 1061. The order prohibited counsel for the government and the defense, as well as the defendant,
from making statements at public meetings regarding the jury, the merits of the case, evidence, witnesses, or court
rulings. Id. at 1060. The trial judge had entered the gag order sua sponte. Id.
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insufficiency of factual findings to satisfy either the "clear and present danger"
standard, or the "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice standard.77
In Chase, the defendants were facing charges for destroying government records
and preventing the administration of the Selective Service Act. 78 The Seventh
Circuit held that cases should be tried in the courts, not in the media.79 However, the
Seventh Circuit determined that there were insufficient facts to justify a gag order.8"
The Seventh Circuit found that the newspaper articles that led to the gag order were
seven months old when the order was issued and were "insufficient support for the
proposition that the defendants' future first amendment utterances, if any, would
interfere with the fair administration of the trial." 8'
Breiner v. Takao82 and Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 3 two other cases where gag
orders were struck down, also demonstrate that there must be sufficient factual
findings to support a gag order. In Breiner,the Hawaii Supreme Court struck down
a gag order,s finding that there was insufficient evidence that the defense attorney
talked with the media about the trial. 85 The court held that restricting extrajudicial
statements by attorneys required a finding that the activity poses a "serious and
imminent threat
to a defendant's right to a fair trial,"86 a standard that was not met
87
in Breiner.

In Kemner, the Illinois Supreme Court held that mere possibilities were
insufficient to support the conclusion that a "serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice exists."88 The court in Kemner held that there were
insufficient facts to support the imposition of the gag order because there was no

77. Id. at 1061; see infra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit held that a gag order
directed at trial participants constituted a prior restraint against speech. Chase, 435 F.2d at 1061.
78. Chase, 435 F.2d at 1060.
79. Id. at 1061.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 835 P.2d 637 (Haw. 1992). In Breiner, the defendant was facing his fourth murder trial in connection
with the death of his infant son. Id. at 639.
83. 492 N.E.2d 1327 (111. 1986).
84. Breiner,835 P.2d at 640. The gag order restricted the attorneys from "making any extrajudicial statement
to any member of the media relating to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably
likely to interfere with a fair trial, during jury selection and the trial in this case." Id.The court issued the gag order
at the prosecution's request after prosecutors saw the defense attorney talking to a reporter. Id. at 639.
85. Id. at 642. The defense attorney told the trial court that his conversation with the reporter was not related
to the case and that he was aware of the disciplinary rules related to extrajudicial comments by attorneys. Id. at 639,
642.
86. Id. at 641.
87. Id. at 642. The court in Breiner found that there was no evidence in the record to show that the defense
attorney's statements posed a serious and imminent threat to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. The trial court
did not make any specific findings to show that the defense attorney "threatened the fair administration ofjustice."
Id. In addition, the court held that the trial court did not consider whether a gag order was the least restrictive
alternative. Id. at 643.
88. Kemner, 492 N.E.2d at 1337. Kemner involved twenty-two consolidated actions for damages where
people were exposed to chemicals following a train derailment. Id. at 1328. The trial court issued the gag order
prohibiting defendant Monsanto Company from discussing the case after the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the
company in contempt for "attempting to influence the outcome of the trial by communicating with the jurors outside
the courtroom." Id. at 1331. The plaintiffs filed the motion after the defendant sent a letter to media organizations
describing "flaws and inaccuracies" in a National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health report. Id. Portions
of the letter appeared in a story about the litigation and the possible link between a chemical (dioxin) and cancer.
Id.
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evidence that showed any jurors were influenced by media reports.8' In addition, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the gag order was unconstitutionally overbroad,"
unconstitutionally vague, 9 and unnecessary because there were less restrictive
alternatives that the court did not consider.92 The court in Kemner held that the gag
order constituted an impermissible prior restraint.93
E. The Confusion Surrounding Standardsin Ethics Rules on Trial Publicity
One area of confusion regarding trial participant speech is the appropriate
standard that should be incorporated in ethics rules regulating attorney speech and
trial publicity.' Model trial publicity rules have incorporated different standards
throughout the years.95 Following the Court's decision in Sheppard, the American
Bar Association (ABA) included DR 7-10796 in its Model Code of Professiohal
Responsibility.97 DR 7-107 instructed lawyers not to make any statements that were
"reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial."98
After Nebraska Press Ass'n, the ABA modified its ethics rule regarding trial
publicity.99 The rule prohibited attorneys from making extrajudicial comments that
pose a "clear and present danger" of prejudicing a court proceeding.' 0 0 But, in 1983,
the ABA changed the rule again, this time introducing Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.6. l Rule 3.6 stated that a lawyer should not make statements that he or

89. Id. at 1337. The gag order was directed only at defendant Monsanto Company, and it ordered the
defendant not to mention the case in the media until the court entered its judgment. Id. at 1332. The order also
prohibited the company from "taking any action outside [the] courtroom that is calculated to or is reasonably
foreseeable to influence any juror in this cause." Id.
90. Id. at 1338. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the gag order was unconstitutionally overbroad
because the order prohibited any mention of the case, "whether or not [the] expressions constitute a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice." Id. The court in Kemner held that an order "must be narrowly
drawn so as not to prohibit speech within first amendment rights that would not be prejudicial to a fair trial." Id.
91. Id. at 1339. The court in Kemner determined that the order was unconstitutionally vague because
"Monsanto can only guess as to what action and utterances will fall under" the order and because the order did not
provide a reliable warning. Id.
92. Id. The less restrictive alternatives included the power to punish parties in contempt for attempting to
influence the outcome of the litigation by communicating with the jury. Id.
93. Id. at 1337. The court in Kemner found that the gag order did not "fit within one of the narrowly defined
exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints." Id. at 1336 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975)).
94. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1068 (1991).
95. See infra notes 96-102, 137 and accompanying text.
96. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBiLITY DR 7-107 (1968).
97. DIENES, supranote 28, at 252; Gabriel G. Gregg, Comment, ABA Rule 3.6 and CaliforniaRule 5-120:
AFia wed App roactliUI# t Problm of Tria#l P ulty

43 vUL
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133(99)
..

98. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(D) (1968); DIENES, supra note 28, at 252.
During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer.. associated with the
prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are
reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without
comment to public records of the court in the case.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONsIBIrry DR 7-107(D) (1968).
99. DIENES, supranote 28, at 253.
100. Id.
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (1983); DIENES, supranote 28, at 253.
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she "'knows or reasonably should know' will have0 2 a 'substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."1
The confusion regarding standards for analyzing whether attorney comments pose
a threat of prejudicing a proceeding stems from the use of different standards by
jurisdiction." 3 Courts use a variety of standards including the "clear and present
danger" standard, also referred to as the "serious and imminent threat" standard, the
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard, and the "reasonable
likelihood" of material prejudice standard.'" Some commentators question whether
there is any constitutionally significant difference among the standards.0 5 However,
in Gentile v. State Bar,"° Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard is a "less demanding" standard than the
"clear and present danger" standard.0 7 Other courts have stated that the "reasonable
likelihood of prejudice" standard is considered to be less protective of attorney
speech than the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard.'0 8
Despite Gentile's holding that "substantial likelihood" is a less demanding
standard, Justice Kennedy, writing in a separate opinion for four justices, argued that
the "clear and present danger" standard may be the linguistic equivalent of the
"substantial likelihood" standard.0 9 However, the history associated with the "clear
and present danger" standard indicates that there is a difference. The "clear and
present danger standard" is often traced to Justice Holmes' opinion in Schenck v.
United States."0 In that case, Justice Holmes articulated a test for determining
whether the convictions of two defendants for distributing leaflets against the draft
during World War I violated their First Amendment rights."' Justice Holmes held
that the question was "whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 'that
they will bring about
12
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."

102. DIENES, supra note 28, at 253 (quoting MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (1983)). The rule
also incorporated a safe harbor provision that included a list of statements that a lawyer can make. MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (1983); DIENES, supra note 28, at 253.
103. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1068 (1991); United States v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6711, at *10 n.3, *10-12 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 13, 2004).
104. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6711, at *10 n.3, *10-12.
105. Joseph T. Rotondo, Note, A ConstitutionalAssessment of CourtRules RestrictingLawyer Comment on
Pending Litigation, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1106, 1119-20 (1980). Rotondo argues that courts should focus their
inquiry on the "imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then to
balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression." Id.
(quoting Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978)).
106. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
107. Id. at 1074-75. New Mexico's rule incorporates the "clear and present danger" standard. Rule 16-306
NMRA.
108. Wachsman v. Supreme Court, No. C-2-90-335, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20899, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
30, 1991).
109. Justice Kennedy stated that the difference between the standards "could prove mere semantics." Gentile,
501 U.S. at 1037. The New Mexico Supreme Court in Twohig also stated the two standards might differ only
"semantically." 1996-NMSC-023, 1 16, 918 P.2d at 337.
110. 249U.S.47,52(1919).
111. Id. at 48-49.
112. Id.at52.
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Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" test was applied to other freedom of
speech cases, including Bridges v. California,"3 a consolidation of two cases dealing
with defendants who had been convicted for comments published in the newspaper
about pending litigation." 4 In Bridges, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the
"clear and present danger standard" had been used in many cases dealing with
freedom of expression. 115 The Court in Bridges used this standard to determine that
the convictions of the defendants violated their First Amendment rights. 1 6 The
Court found that the principle evolving from the use of "clear and present danger"
in other cases was that "the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.""' 7 In
addition, the Court recognized that the First Amendment "must be taken as a
command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a
liberty-loving society, will allow.""'
The history of the "clear and present danger" test," 9 as well as the U.S. Supreme
Court's recognition that the "substantial likelihood" test is a "less demanding"
standard, 20 demonstrates that there is a difference among the standards. Furthermore, the ABA has stated that "substantial likelihood" was not intended to be the
equivalent of "clear and present danger."'' The difference among the standards
means that attorney comments that might not be enough to present a "clear and
present danger" of prejudicing a proceeding could be enough to create a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing a proceeding.' 22 Therefore, in states like New
Mexico, which require a "clear and present danger" of prejudice, attorney speech is
more protected than in other states where ethics rules allow an attorney to be
disciplined for extrajudicial statements on a lesser showing of prejudice to the
proceeding.' 23
F. Gentile: "SubstantialLikelihood" StandardSufficient for Analyzing Attorney
Speech
In Gentile, the ABA's Model Rule 3.6 and its provisions regulating attorney
speech became the center of controversy in a case involving a Nevada lawyer's outof-court statements. The case involved a lawyer's challenge of the application of
25
Nevada's equivalent of Rule 3.6.124 Gentile did not involve the use of a gag order.

113. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
114. Id. at 258.
115. Id. at 262.
116. See id. at 270.
ii7. Id. at 263.
118. Id. In Gentile, Justice Kennedy argued that the words "clear and present danger" are not necessary to
make a rule regulating speech constitutional. 501 U.S. at 1036. Justice Kennedy, quoting Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331,353 (1946), argued that Justice Holmes' test was not intended to "express a technical legal doctrine."
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036.
119. See supra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
120. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074-75.
121. Gregg, supranote 97, at 1367.
122. See id. at 1366-68.
123. See id.; infra text accompanying note 139.
124. NEV. Sup. CT. R. 177 (1986) (amended 1996); Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
125. Gentile, 501 US. at 1030.
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Rather, the State Bar of Nevada disciplined attorney Dominic Gentile for statements
he made during a press conference after his client was indicted, before a gag order
could be imposed.'26 The lawyer had been reprimanded for violating Nevada
Supreme Court Rule 177, which was almost identical to ABA Model Rule 3.6.127
The Supreme Court held that, "[b]ecause lawyers have special access to information
through discovery and client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose a
threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding since lawyers' statements are likely
to be received as especially authoritative.' 2 8
The Court described lawyers as "key participants"' 29 in the justice system and
added that the "State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in
regulating their speech as well as their conduct."'' 30 The Court held that the
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard incorporated in Rule 3.6 may
be used to regulate attorney speech. 3 The Court held that although "substantial
likelihood" was a "less demanding" standard, it "constitute[d] a constitutionally
permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending
cases and the State's interest in fair trials.' 3 2
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gentile allows courts to regulate attorney
speech more than the speech of other trial participants.133 That does not mean that
states must regulate the speech more closely. 134 The Court's holding stated that

126. Id.Gentile's client, Grady Sanders, was indicted in connection with the theft of large amounts of cocaine
and travelers' checks from a safety deposit box at the vault company he owned. Id. at 1039-40. The drugs and
money were being used as part of an undercover police investigation. Id. Two detectives who had access to the vault
submitted to lie detector tests, but the person who administered the tests was later arrested for distributing cocaine
to an FBI informant. Id. at 1041. Press reports suggested that the FBI suspected that local police officers were
responsible for the theft. Id. Gentile was aware of the publicity surrounding the case, including numerous newspaper
articles and television stories. Id. at 1042. In an effort to counter what he believed to be prejudicial publicity to his
client, Gentile held a press conference and made statements concerning evidence that he said demonstrated his
client's innocence. Id. at 1042, 1045. In addition, Gentile's statements indicated that the likely thief was a police
detective and that the detective could be observed in a videotape suffering from symptoms of cocaine use. Id. at
1045. Gentile also said that other victims of theft at the vault company were not credible because most were drug
dealers or money launderers. Id.
127. Id. at 1033. Compare NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177 (1986) (amended 1996) ("A lawyer shall not make an
extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication
if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding."), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (1983). See supra note 102 and
accompanying text. The Nevada rule also included a safe harbor provision, just as the 1983 version of Model Rule
3.6 did. NEV. SuP. CT. R. 177(3) (1986) (amended 1996); MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3.6(c) (1983); see
infra note 132.
128. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1075.
132. Id. at 1074-75. However, a different alignment of Justices found Nevada's Rule 177 void for vagueness
for its safe harbor provision, which stated:
[A] lawyer.. .may state without elaboration: (a) the general nature of the claim or defense; (b)
the information contained in a public record; (c) that an investigation of the matter is in progress,
including the general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense involved and,
except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved.
Id. at 1048, 1061-62; NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177 (1986). In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held
that Rule 177 failed to provide fair notice and failed to provide sufficient guidance to lawyers for when their remarks
constitute a violation of the rule. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-49.
133. See supranotes 128-132 and accompanying text.
134. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074.
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attorney speech "may be regulated under a less demanding standard."'' 35 As the next
section demonstrates, not all states have chosen to adopt the
36 "substantial likelihood"
standard in regulating attorney speech in pending cases. 1
G. TrialParticipantSpeech in New Mexico
In response to Gentile, the ABA again revised Model Rule 3.6 in 1994,37
maintaining the use of the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard.
New Mexico has not adopted the amended 1994 version of Model Rule 3.6,
maintaining a different version of the ethics rule regulating trial publicity. 3 ' New
Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct 16-306 states that a lawyer should not make
an extrajudicial statement in a criminal proceeding if the lawyer "knows or
the statement "creates a clear and present danger of
reasonably should know" that
' 139
prejudicing the proceeding.
The New Mexico Constitution serves as a basis for Rule 16-306.' 40 Article II,
section 17 states that "[e]very person may freely speak.. .his sentiments on all
subjects...; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press."' 14 ' As evidenced by the language of article II, section 17, New
Mexico's free speech provision differs somewhat from the First Amendment.142 The
New Mexico Court of Appeals has held that freedom of speech under article II,
provides greater protection than the First
section 17 of the New Mexico Constitution
43
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.1
While case law dealing with free speech rights of trial participants in New
Mexico is scarce," prior to Twohig the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the
issue of gag orders directed at the news media in State ex rel. New Mexico Press

135. Id.
136. See infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (1994); DIENES, supranote 28, at 256. The amendments
to the rule were intended to clarify the safe harbor provision held unconstitutional in Gentile. Gregg, supranote 97,
at 1350. In addition, the rule included a "right of reply" provision, which allows lawyers to make limited statements,
in certain circumstances, to respond to adverse publicity. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (1994);
Gregg, supranote 97, at 1350-5 1.
138. Rule 16-306 NMRA.
139. Id.
140. Twohig v. Blackmer, 1996-NMSC-023, '112, 918 P.2d 332, 335.
141. Compare N.M. CONST. art. l1, § 17, with U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.").
142. See City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 114 N.M. 537, 545, 843 P.2d 839, 847 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
the "authors of the New Mexico Constitution were aware of the language of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and consciously chose to adopt a different formula").
143. See id. at 547, 843 P.2d at 849; State v. Rendleman, 2003-NMCA-150, 1 58, 82 P.3d 554, 570; infra
notes 447-454 and accompanying text.
144. Albuquerque Journalv. Jewell, 2001-NMSC-005, 17 P.3d 437, is one of the few New Mexico cases
dealing with a trial participant gag order. However, the case is unusual in that it did not involve a gag order imposed
by the court; rather, the gag order was stipulated to by the parties involved. Id. 6, 17 P.3d at 439. In addition,
Jewell arose from a children's court case. Id.1 1, 17 P.3d at 438. In Jewell, the news media challenged the stipulated
gag order on the grounds that the judge failed to make factual findings supporting the necessity of the gag order,
and that the judge failed to consider less restrictive alternatives. Id. 7, 17 P.3d at 439-40. The court agreed, citing
Twohig, and ordered the gag order dissolved. Id. 117, 9, 17 P.3d at 440. The New Mexico Supreme Court remanded
the matter to the children's court, requiring factual findings if the court chose to reinstate the order. Id. 9, 17 P.3d
at 440.
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Ass 'n v. Kaufman.'45 Kaufman involved a challenge to a court order prohibiting the
news media from publishing jurors' names in a criminal trial.'4 6 The trial arose out
of a riot at the state penitentiary in Santa Fe in 1980.' 7
The court in Kaufman struck down the gag order, holding that the prohibition on
publishing the jurors' names constituted a prior restraint.'48 By preventing the news
media from publishing the names of the jurors, the court found that the trial court
had "[i]n effect.. .partially closed the trial from the [m]edia."' 4 9 After applying the
three-prong test articulated in Nebraska PressAss 'n," the court in Kaufman found
that the order was not narrowly tailored. 5 ' The New Mexico Supreme Court held
that "a prior restraint on publication ofjurors' names must be based upon imperative
circumstances supported by a record that clearly demonstrates that a defendant's
right to a fair trial will be jeopardized and that there are no other reasonable
alternatives to protect that right."' 52 The emphasis in Kaufman on consideration of
reasonable alternatives, and also of specific factual findings to support a gag order,
is echoed in Twohig."'
In conclusion, prior to Twohig, the New Mexico Supreme Court had not
addressed the issue of trial participant gag orders since the increase in their use
following Sheppardand NebraskaPressAss "n.5' In its decision in Twohig, the New
Mexico Supreme Court tackled some of the issues surrounding trial participant gag
orders in New Mexico, including whether gag orders directed at trial participants are
prior restraints and the appropriate analysis for evaluating extrajudicial comments
by attorneys.155 In addition, the court in Twohig discussed New Mexico's ethics rule
on trial publicity, including the rule's use of the "clear and present danger"
standard.'56 In doing so, the New Mexico Supreme Court provided guidance on the
constitutionality of gag orders directed at trial participants in New Mexico.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On Christmas Eve night in 1992, Paul Cravens, along with his wife Melanie and
his three stepdaughters, nine-year-old Kandyce, eight-year-old Erin, and five-yearold Kacee, was driving west on Interstate 40.15' The family was heading toward
Nine Mile Hill for a better view of the Christmas lights around Albuquerque. 5 ' As

145. 98 N.M. 261, 263, 648 P.2d 300, 302 (1982).
146. Id. at 263, 648 P.2d at 302.
147. Id. at 266, 648 P.2d at 305.
148. Id. at 267, 648 P.2d at 306.
149. Id. at 266, 648 P.2d at 305.
150. 427 U.S. at 562. The court in Kaufman restated the Nebraska PressAss"n test as follows: "(1)What is
the nature and extent of the evil of publication? (2) Are there any alternatives to imposing a gag order? and (3) Were
the means selected adequately tailored to accomplish the ends sought?" Kaufman, 98 N.M. at 266, 648 P.2d at 305;
see supra note 42.
151. Kaufman, 98 N.M. at 267, 648 P.2d at 306.
152. Id.
153. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 26, 918 P.2d at 340.
154. See supra Part H.B.
155. See infra notes 227-229, 251 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
157. See Twohig v. Blackmer, 1996-NMSC-023, 2, 918 P.2d 332, 333; Kate Nelson, 1-40 CrashBrings
Back the Horror,the Pain, the Ghosts, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Jan. 29, 2002 [hereinafter Nelson, 1-40 Crash].
158. Nelson, 1-40 Crash,supranote 157.
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they approached 98th street, a pickup truck, driving the wrong way on the interstate,
crashed head-on into their car.' 59 Melanie Cravens and her three daughters were
killed instantly."6 Paul Cravens was seriously injured.161
Witnesses reported that Gordon House, the driver of the pickup truck, was driving
at speeds of nearly ninety miles per hour when he collided with the Cravens' car. 62
Other drivers in House's path tried to avoid him by pulling off the highway onto the
shoulder and into the median; some honked their horns and flashed their lights in an
effort to stop House. 63 A police officer pacing House from the other side of the
interstate shined his spotlight on House's pickup and turned his emergency lights
on, but House never heeded the attempts to stop him."6 Investigators suspected that
he had been drinking. 165 House later admitted that he drank at least seven-and-onehalf beers earlier that night.'66 Five hours after the deadly accident, tests revealed
a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent, then the legal standard for
that House had
167
intoxication.
Publicity surrounding the fatal Christmas Eve accident and House's prosecution
was considered to be "unprecedented in New Mexico. ' 68 The New Mexico Supreme
169
Court described the case as one of the most publicized in New Mexico history.
The case was "so transformed by publicity that all those involved were compelled
to evaluate how the defendant could receive a fair trial."' 70
Attorney Ray Twohig defended House during the three trials. 7 ' Twohig and
District Attorney Robert Schwartz, as well as other prosecutors, talked extensively
159. See Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,

2, 918 P.2d at 333; Kate Nelson, The Eternity of Paul Cravens,

ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Aug. 26, 2000.

160. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 2, 918 P.2d at 333.
161. Nelson, supra note 159. Paul Cravens suffered a punctured lung, multiple fractures, and a severely
bruised brain. Id. Initially, doctors told his family he would never walk or talk again. Id. Today, Cravens has
regained his speech and walking abilities. Id.
162. Gutierrez Krueger, Gordon House CaseIsn't Over, Both Sides Say, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Apr. 7, 1999.
163. See State v. House, 1999-NMSC-014, 6, 978 P.2d 967, 973; Nelson, 1-40 Crash,supra note 157.
164. House, 1999-NMSC-014, 6, 978 P.2d at 973; Nelson, 1-40 Crash,supranote 157.
165. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 2, 918 P.2d at 333.
166. State v. House, 1998-NMCA-018, 3, 953 P.2d 737, 740.
167. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 2, 918 P.2d at 333. At his trials, House maintained that it was not the
alcohol that caused the accident. House, 1998-NMCA-018,1 3,953 P.2d at 740. He stated that a migraine headache
caused him to become disoriented and turn onto the wrong side of the highway. Id. As a result of the accident that
killed Melanie Cravens and her three daughters, New Mexico lowered the legal standard for intoxication to 0.08
percent three months after the accident. NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(C)(1) (2004); Krueger, supra note 162.
168. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 2, 918 P.2d at 333. The publicity surrounding the case was heaviest in
Albuquerque, see id. 27, 918 P.2d at 340, although it also stretched across the state and nationally. See House,
2-3,8-10,57, an. 1-51,978 P.2d at 973,985,998, nn.1-51. Court TVbroadcast House's third
1999-NMSC-014,
trial, which took place in Las Cruces. Court TVAirs Live Coverage of House Trial,ALBUQUERQUEJ., July 24, 1995.
DatelineNBC began following the case shortly after the accident and aired a story follo-Wig House's third trial.
J.Gutierrez Krueger, "Dateline NBC" Delves Into Gordon House Case, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 27, 1996. The
New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and other national newspapers also covered the case. See FatalWrong- Way
DriverGets 22- Year Term, Cm. TRIB., July 25, 1995; Michael Haederle, PowerofGrief,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16,1993;
Navajo "Bright Star" Convicted in Deaths: Controversial Verdict in 3rd Trial, HOUS. ClRON., July 26, 1995;
Repeat Trials of Navajo in FatalCrash PolarizeNew Mexico Residents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1995.
169. House, 1999-NMSC-014,1 8,978 P.2d at 973. In fact, the New Mexico Supreme Court said, "the media
coverage itself became an inextricable part of the story." Id. 1 10, 978 P.2d at 973.
170. Id. 2, 978 P.2d at 972. In its 1999 opinion affirming House's convictions for vehicular homicide, the
New Mexico Supreme Court went on to describe the publicity as "frenetic," "extensive," and "extreme, if not
outrageous." Id. 1 2, 13, 57, 978 P.2d at 972, 974, 985.
171. Lawyers to Honor Defense Attorney, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 8, 2000.
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to the media about the case prior to the first trial. 7 2 Both defense and prosecution
attorneys talked about their strategies and their opinions about the case, including
the results of House's blood test taken on the night of the crash. 173 In response to the
release of information about the blood tests by the prosecution and police, Twohig
attacked the results of the tests, telling a news reporter that the testing equipment at
the Albuquerque Police Department lab was broken around the same time the blood74
test was analyzed and that not all of the "important facts" had been made public.
Twohig also made multiple comments to the media about racial bias in the
case.' 75 Twohig argued that the charges against his client were racially motivated.'76
In a story by the Navajo Times, an Arizona newspaper, Twohig was quoted as
saying, "[I]f Gordon House was not Native American and if the victims were not
Anglos, despite tragedy, [this case] would not have received any where [sic] near
the kind of media attention it has generated."' 177 In the same article, Twohig alleged
that the police were trying to leak information to the media to "get their story before
the public as effectively as possible.' ' 178 He told the newspaper that the media and
the public had already convicted House and they had "the noose ready for him."' 79
After announcing a decision to add first-degree, depraved-mind murder charges
against House, 80 District Attorney Robert Schwartz justified the decision by
explaining that the State had obtained new information that gave it reason to believe
that a more serious charge than vehicular homicide was appropriate.' 8 ' Schwartz also
told the Albuquerque Tribune that the State had evidence that House had a chance
to avoid the accident.182 In a story by the Albuquerque Journal,Twohig denounced
the District Attorney's choice to pursue first-degree murder charges, calling the
decision "prosecutorial overreaching."' 83

172. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 3, 918 P.2d at 333.
173. Id.Twohig told the Albuquerque Journalin January of 1993 (prior to the first trial) that he was planning
to use experts to determine whether the signs on the interstate off ramp were confusing. Id. (citing Patricia Gabbett
Snow, Officer: Pickup Sped Wrong Way 10 Miles, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 9, 1993). The chief deputy district
attorney was quoted as saying that the tests from the blood sample taken at the hospital the night of the crash were
consistent with the blood alcohol tests from the police department. See id. (citing Snow, supra); supra text
accompanying note 167.
174. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,
4, 918 P.2d at 333 (citing Valerie Taliman, Family Seeks FairJustice,
NAVAO TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993).

175. Id.15,918 P.2d at 334.
176. Id.
177. Taliman, supra note 174, at 1. The allegations of racial bias stemmed in part from a comment made by
District Attorney Schwartz. Nelson, supra note 159. Schwartz said House should take responsibility for the
"massacre." Id. Twohig alleged that the word "massacre" was intended to evoke negative images of Native
Americans. Id.
178. Taliman, supra note 174, at 3.
179. Id.
180. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 6,918 P.2d at 334. House was also facing charges of vehicular homicide,
driving while intoxicated, great bodily injury by vehicle, reckless driving, and eluding an officer. State v. House,
1999-NMSC-014, 1 11, 978 P.2d 967, 973. The trial judge dismissed the depraved-mind murder charges after a
preliminary hearing. Id.
181. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,
6, 918 P.2d at 334 (citing Leslie Linthicum, House May Face Murder
Charges, SUNDAY J. (Albuquerque), Mar. 21, 1993).
182. Id. (citing Laura Bendix, DWI Defense Denounces Murder Charges,ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 22,
1993).
183. Id. (citing Linthicum, supra note 181).
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As a result of the extensive pretrial publicity, House made a motion for a change
of venue for his first trial.' The trial judge granted the motion and moved the trial
to Taos County.185 Extensive media coverage of the trial continued in Taos.'86 The
jury in House's first trial found him guilty of driving while intoxicated.' 87 However,
the trial resulted in a hung jury on charges of reckless driving, vehicular homicide,
and causing great bodily harm.'8 8 Following the jury verdict, the attorneys
commented extensively about the trial in the media.' 89 Amidst widespread media
coverage, House was tried a second time on vehicular homicide charges in
November 1994,'90 but the second trial also resultedin a mistrial.' 9' After the second
mistrial on vehicular homicide charges, District Attorney Schwartz announced that
he would retry House for a third time. 92 Schwartz stated that House should take
responsibility for his actions and also said that the jurors who voted to acquit only
could have done so out of sympathy.' 93
After Schwartz announced his decision to pursue a third trial, the Albuquerque
Journal published an article written by Twohig in response to Schwartz'
comments.'94 Twohig argued that justice would not be served by a third trial.1 95 In
addition, he wrote that the district attorney has "adopted the lust for vengeance of
some who speak for the Cravens... famil[y]."' 96 During appearances on several radio
talk shows, Twohig discussed issues of evidence and law at the first two trials and
responded to questions. 197
In response, the State sought an injunction prohibiting all attorneys, parties,
witnesses, and related persons from making "any comment in the media.. .regarding
any substantive issue dealing with [the House] case."' 9 8 Twohig responded to the
State's motion by asserting his First Amendment right to speak about the case.'99
Twohig argued that he had a right to respond to the "misleading and inaccurate
statements of the District Attorney" and that the district attorney had "created a
strong sentiment against [House] in the public arena. ' 2 ° Twohig also argued that the
Code of Professional Responsibility only prohibited him from making comments

184. House, 1999-NMSC-014, 1 12, 978 P.2d at 974.
185. Id.
186. Id. 13, 978 P.2d at 974.
187. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 7, 918 P.2d at 334.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. House's second trial also took place in Taos County. House, 1999-NMSC-014, 1 15, 978 P.2d at 974.
The trial
began on November 7, 1994. Id.
191. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 8,918 P.2d at 334.
192. Id. House's third trial took place in Las Cruces, New Mexico, in May 1995 after the judge granted a
request for a change of venue to Doila Ana County. House, 1999-NMSC-014,
20-21, 978 P.2d at 975.
193. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 8, 918 P.2d at 334.
194. Id. 9, 918 P.2d at 334.
195. Ray Twohig, Justice Would Not Be Served by Third Trialfor Gordon House, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec.
2, 1994.
196. Id.
197. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 9, 918 P.2d at 334.
198. Id. 1 10, 918 P.2d at 334.
199. Id. 1 10, 918 P.2d at 335.
200. Id.
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or created a "clear and present danger of prejudicing the
that were false
' 2 11
proceeding.
After a hearing on the State's motion for an injunction, District Judge James F.
Blackmer imposed a gag order prohibiting both defense and prosecuting attorneys,
and all trial participants, from "making any extrajudicial oral or written statement,
comment, opinion, press release, letter or other communication to or through any
media or public fora, .. on any substantive matters or substantive issues of this
case." 2 2 The district court also prohibited the attorneys from releasing court
documents to the media without the court's approval."'
Following the court's decision to implement the gag order, Twohig petitioned the
New Mexico Supreme Court for a writ of superintending control vacating the trial
court's order. 2' Twohig maintained that the gag order "impermissibly restricted his
rights of free speech in violation of article II, section 17 of. the New Mexico
Constitution"2 °5 and New Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct 16-306.2 °6 The New
Mexico Supreme Court vacated the gag order at a hearing held on March 22,
1995.207 The court explained its reasoning for vacating the order in its opinion in
Twohig v. Blackmer.2°8 House's third trial resulted in convictions on vehicular
homicide charges, great bodily injury by vehicle, and reckless driving. 2' He was
sentenced to twenty-two years in prison.210
IV. RATIONALE
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Twohig held that there must be specific,
factual findings to demonstrate that extrajudicial statements would pose a "clear and
present danger" to the "administration of justice," in order for a court to justify
issuing a gag order on trial participants.2 11 In vacating the gag order, the court held

201. Id.
202. Id. This was not the first time the court had issued an order restricting speech concerning the trial. Leslie
Linthicum, House Gag OrderChallenged,ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 22, 1995. Judges in House's first two trials also
imposed gag orders. Id.
10,918 P.2d at 335.
203. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,
204. Id. 1, 918 P.2d at 333.
205. N.M. CONST. art. 1I, § 17 ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects.. .and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge [that right].").
206. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 1, 918 P.2d at 333. New Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct 16-306
states that "[a] lawyer shall not make any extrajudicial... statement in a criminal proceeding.. .that the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know: (1) is false; or (2) creates a clear and present danger of prejudicing the proceeding."
Rule 16-306 NMRA.
207. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,1 1,918 P.2d at 333. After the New Mexico Supreme Court vacated the gag
order, the trial judge imposed a new gag order on public statements concerning the trial. House, 1999-NMSC-014,
18, 978 P.2d at 974. No litigation resulted from the second gag order. Id.
208. 1996-NMSC-023, 918 P.2d 332.
209. House, 1999-NMSC-014, 21, 978 P.2d at 975.
210. Id. House is currently serving his sentence at a prison outside of Santa Rosa, New Mexico. Leslie
Linthicum, High Court Rejects Gordon House Appeal, ALBUQUERQUE J." Oct. 5, 1999. Following his conviction,
House appealed the verdict to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. House, 1998-NMCA-018, 953 P.2d 737. The
Court of Appeals reversed his convictions, holding that the court should have tried to select a jury in Taos County
before moving the trial to Dofia Ana County. Id. 1 70, 953 P.2d at 753. In 1999, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed House's convictions. House, 1999-NMSC-014, 113,978 P.2d at 1001.
House also appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court declined to hear the case. House v. New Mexico, 528
U.S. 894 (1999).
211. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 11,918 P.2dat 335.
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that the order imposed by the trial court violated both article II, section 17 of the
New Mexico Constitution212 and Rule of Professional Conduct 16-306.213 The court
in Twohig deemed that the findings by the trial court were insufficient to support a
prior restraint on speech.2 14 The court determined that the trial court failed to "la[y]
out the factual foundation for finding a substantial likelihood of prejudice or clear
and present danger to a fair and impartial trial. ' ' 21 5 The court went on to say that the
trial court "merely dr[ew] the conclusion" that the extrajudicial statements in the
case would have had a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the jury trial,
and did not analyze the facts supporting its conclusion that a gag order was
necessary.21 6 The trial court also failed to consider less restrictive alternatives to the
gag order.217
An important consideration for the court in Twohig, in determining the validity
of the gag order, was the balance between a defendant's right to a fair trial in a
criminal case and free speech rights.2 Is The court turned to the New Mexico Rules
of Professional Conduct for guidance on striking this balance when dealing with
attorney speech." 9 The court found that New Mexico's use of the "clear and present
danger" standard was an "articulation ofthe abstract considerations" 20 that impacted
the balancing of interests involved in evaluating pretrial publicity.22
In addition, the court looked at article II, section 17 of the New Mexico
2223
Constitution,"' a foundation
for Rule 16-306,23 in determining the validity of a
prior restraint on speech. 224 The court held that article II, section 17 prohibits the
legislature from abridging free speech, and therefore, it follows that courts should
not be allowed to do so either.225 The court determined that,22based
on article II,
6
section 17, the gag order was subject to constitutional scrutiny.
The court then went on to determine that the gag order in the Twohig case, which
prohibited trial participants from speaking about the case, was a prior restraint.227
The court noted that prior restraints "come[] to [the] [c]ourt with a 'heavy
presumption' against [their] constitutional validity., 22 However, the court also
determined that prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se and that a court may

212. N.M. CONST. art. 11,
§ 17.
213. Rule 16-306 NMRA; Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 1, 918 P.2d at 333.
214. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, I 26-28, 918 P.2d at 340-41.

215. Id. 126, 918 P.2d at 340.
216. Id.
217. Id.

218. Id. 14, 918 P.2d at 336. This case is interesting because it involves a defense attorney requesting that
the gag order be vacated. The defense attorney felt his client had a better chance at a fair trial if he could speak about
the case and set the record straight. Id. 1 10, 918 P.2d at 334-35; see discussion infra Part VLA.
219. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,1 11, 918 P.2d at 335.
220. Id. 14, 918 P.2d at 336.
221. Id.
222. N.M. CONST. art. I, § 17; see supra note 205; infra notes 448-454 and accompanying text.
223. Rule 16-306 NMRA.
224. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 12, 918 P.2d at 335.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. 13, 981 P.2d at 335. Not all courts are in agreement as to whether a gag order prohibiting trial
participants from speaking is a prior restraint. See infra Part V.A. 1.
228. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 13, 918 P.2d at 336 (quoting State ex rel. N.M. Press Ass'n v. Kaufman,
98 N.M. 261, 264, 648 P.2d 300, 303 (1982)).
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restrict extrajudicial comments by attorneys in order to balance fair adjudication and
free speech.229
After establishing that prior restraints on speech are not favored, the court in
Twohig reviewed other case law. The court in Twohig looked specifically to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Gentile v. State Bar230 for guidance on analyzing

attorney political speech. 23' The New Mexico Supreme Court found, based on
Gentile, that attorneys have a responsibility to not engage in public debate that will
impair a defendant's right to a fair trial.232 In addition, the court in Twohig noted that
the Supreme Court upheld the use of the "substantial likelihood" standard when
dealing with attorney speech in Gentile.233
After discussing the Supreme Court's analysis in Gentile, the court in Twohig
then turned back to New Mexico's Rule 16-306 to determine what standard to apply
in addressing attorney speech outside of the courtroom.2 34 The court observed that
New Mexico's "clear and present danger" standard differs from the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard.235 While the "clear and present danger"
standard is arguably more protective of speech, the New Mexico Supreme Court
noted that the standards differ "semantically., 236 The court established that whatever
standard is adopted, the analysis remains the same: "[A] court [must] make its own
inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from [a]
particular utterance and then.. .balance the character of the evil, as well as its
likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression., 237 Therefore, based
on Rule 16-306238 and the court's analysis of Gentile,239 the proper test, regardless
of which standard is used,2" balances the potentially dangerous effects of
extrajudicial comments on fair adjudication and the need for free speech.24 1
The court then continued its analysis of case law by focusing on cases upholding
gag orders24 2 and cases striking down gag orders in other jurisdictions.24 3 The court
explained that its research showed that the number of cases upholding and striking

229. Id. 1 14, 918 P.2d at 336 (citing Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327, 1336-37 (1986)).
230. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
231. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 15, 918 P.2d at 336; see supra Part l.F.
232. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,1 15, 918 P.2d at 336 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074 (citing Neb. Press
Ass 'n, 427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., specially concurring))).
233. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 15,918 P.2d at 336 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075); see supraPart H.F.
234. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 16, 918 P.2d at 337.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. 16, 918 P.2d at 337 (quoting Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1036 (quoting Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978))).
238. Rule 16-306NMRA.
239. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 15, 918 P.2d at 336.
240. Despite describing the difference in standards for evaluating extrajudicial statements by attorneys as
semantics, see id. 1 16, 918 P.2d at 337, the court in Twohig maintained the use of the "clear and present danger"
standard in Rule 16-306, id. 1 1, 918 P.2d at 333, even though the U.S. Supreme Court held that the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard is acceptable. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075; see supra Part I.E.
241. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 116, 918 P.2d at 337.
242. Id. - 18-20, 918 P.2d at 337-38; see Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cit. 1985); United
States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969); see also supra Part Il.C.
21-25,918 P.2d at 338-40; see Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir.
243. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,
1970) (per curiam); Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637 (Haw. 1992); Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327 (1L
1986); see also supra Part H.D.
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down gag orders were equal. 2" Based on cases considering gag orders, the court laid
out five considerations that a trial court must address before issuing a gag order:
"what may not be said, when it may not be said, where it may not be said, who may
not say it, and whether alternatives less restrictive of free speech than'245
an outright
ban would suffice to alleviate any prejudice caused by further speech.
After considering cases that upheld and struck down gag orders, the New Mexico
Supreme Court determined that the facts in the instant case showed that the pretrial
publicity was not a significant factor in the case. 2' The court pointed out that the
trial was not taking place where most of the media coverage had occurred.247 In
addition, the court looked at news articles, which showed that despite publicity
about the case, residents where the first two trials had taken place did not know
much about the trial. 248 The court also noted that the attorneys had the opportunity
for voir dire and jurors had been questioned extensively about a variety of issues in
the case.249
In issuing the writ of superintending control vacating the order, the court in
Twohig concluded that
allow[ing] the gag order to stand in the face of a complete lack of factual
findings to support the conclusion that such an order was necessary to preserve
the parties' right to a fair trial would have done serious injustice to the principle
that post-speech remedies are favored over prior restraints.2'"
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the gag order did not indicate whether
the trial court had made specific factual findings to support-the order and the gag
order also did not indicate whether the trial court considered less restrictive
alternatives.
Each of the trial participant gag order cases that the court in Twohig analyzed
turned on the criteria of whether there were specific factual findings to justify the
imposition of a gag order. 2 The court based its decision on the lack of factual
findings sufficient to uphold the gag order.253 The court concluded that any prior
restraint must be supported by specific factual findings showing that extrajudicial
comments violate Rule 16-306, or in the words of the rule, that254
the comments pose
a "clear and present danger" to the "administration of justice.

244. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 17, 918 P.2d at 337.
245. Id.
246. Id. 1 26-27, 918 P.2d at 340.
247. Id. 27, 918 P.2d at 340. The case received a "tremendous amount of publicity" in Albuquerque, but
the trial took place in Taos. Id.
248. Id. (citing Ed Asher, Gordon House? Who's That? Taos Asks, ALBUQUERQUE TRB., June 7, 1994).
House's first two trials took place in Taos. Id.
249. Id. (citing Leslie Linthicum, PotentialHouse Jurors Questioned,ALBUQUERQUE J.,June 7, 1994). Voir
dire and the extensive questioning of jurors are "tool[s] [used] to combat potential prejudice caused by pretrial
publicity." Id. Voir dire is an example of a less restrictive alternative that may be used instead of a gag order. Neb.
PressAss "n,
427 U.S. at 563-64; see supra text accompanying note 52.
250. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,1 28, 918 P.2d at 341.
251. Id. 26,918P.2dat340.
252. Id. 17, 918 P.2d at 337.
253. Id. 1 26, 918 P.2d at 340.
254. Id. 11,918P.2dat335.
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V. ANALYSIS
The role of the media is to serve as a check on the government, including the
courts. 25' The U.S. Supreme Court in Sheppard v.Maxwell2 6 acknowledged the
25 7
importance of disseminating information about court proceedings to the public.
By covering trials and reporting news to the public, the press "guards against the
miscarriage ofjustice. 2 8 To be able to perform this role effectively, the news media
must be able to provide complete and accurate reports, without the restricted flow
of information.259
Therefore, the New Mexico Supreme Court took the correct approach when it
provided broad protection for trial participant speech in New Mexico in Twohig. The
court did so by defining and analyzing a trial participant gag order as a prior
restraint, 2 ° and by requiring judges to make specific factual findings26 ' showing that
they considered less restrictive alternatives 26 2 as justification for imposing a gag
order.263 While the court in Twohig failed to recognize "clear and present danger"
as a more protective standard,26 in light of the court's determination that gagging
trial participants constitutes a prior restraint, the "clear and present danger" standard
is more appropriate when dealing with attorney speech. 265 Despite the ABA's
decision to adopt the "substaiitial likelihood of prejudice" standard for regulating
attorney speech, 266 New Mexico's continued use of the "clear and present danger"
standard in its rule of professional conduct adds to the expansive protection given
to trial participant speech in New-Mexico.267
A. A Gag Orderon Trial ParticipantsIs a PriorRestraint
The New Mexico Supreme Court was correct in Twohig when it held that a gag
order on attorneys and other trial participants is a prior restraint. 26 While some
courts have held that gag orders directed at trial participants, unlike gag orders
directed at the media, are not prior restraints,269 the more appropriate approach is to
analyze all gag orders as prior restraints.270 By invoking prior restraint analysis, the

255. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
256. 384 U.S. 333.
257. Id.at349; see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
258. Sheppard,384 U.S. at 350.
259. See Gauthier, supra note 9.
260. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,1 13, 918 P.2d at 335.
1 1,918 P.2d at 333.
261. Id.
262. See id. 26, 918 P.2d at 340.
1 28, 918 P.2d at 341.
263. Id.
1 16, 918 P.2d at 337.
264. See id.
265. See infra notes 348-357 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
267. See Rule 16-306 NMRA.
268. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,1 13,918 P.2d at 335.
269. See Inre Dow Jones, 842 F.2d 603, 608-09 (2d Cir. 1988); RTNA v. U.S. Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443,
1447 (9th Cir. 1986); infra text accompanying notes 289-293.
270. See United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445,446-47 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596,
599 (6th Cir. 1987); Journal Publ'g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986); Levine v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 764 F.2d 590,595 (9th Cir. 1985); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975); Breiner v. Takao,
835 P.2d 637, 641 (Haw. 1992); Chemerinksy, supra note 5, at 313; infra text accompanying notes 277-288.
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New Mexico Supreme Court imposed a heavy burden that must be overcome before
a gag order is properly placed on trial participants.27'
1. Division Among the Courts
After Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,272 there is no question that gag orders
directed at the news media are prior restraints. 273 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has not addressed the question of whether gag orders directed at trialparticipants
fall into the same category.2 74 Characterizing a trial participant gag order as a prior
restraint is significant because it invokes a "heavy presumption against...
constitutional validity" and increases the burden of proving that a gag order is
necessary. 275 There is not a consensus among federal circuit and state courts on
whether trial participant gag orders are prior restraints.276
Some circuits have held that trial participant gag orders are prior restraints.277 In
CBS, Inc. v. Young,275 for example, the court held that an order that prohibited the
parties, relatives, close friends, and associates from discussing the case with the
news media was a prior restraint.2 79 The gag order was placed on trial participants
involved in a civil lawsuit that arose from the killings of four Kent State University
students by the National Guard in 1970.28' The Sixth Circuit found that the gag order
created a "restrictive ban upon freedom of expression" and an "extreme example of
a prior restraint."'
The Sixth Circuit applied the same analysis in the criminal context in United
282 In Ford,
States v. Ford.
Congressman Harold Ford was on trial for mail and bank
2
83
fraud. The district court imposed a gag order that prohibited Congressman Ford
from making any public comments.284 Again, the court found that the order was a
prior restraint on speech, holding that "such broadly based restrictions on speech in
connection with litigation are seldom, if ever, justified., 285 The Tenth Circuit, in

271. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 13, 918 P.2d at 336; Neb. Press Ass"n, 427 U.S. at 558 (quoting Carroll
v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968)).
272. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
273. Id. at 558-59; see supra note 25.
274. Neb. Press Ass 'n, 427 U.S. 539.
275. See id. at 558.
276. Compare In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d 603, 608-09 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a gag order directed at
trial participants is not a prior restraint), with Journal Publ'g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986)
(holding that "any inhibitions against news coverage of a trial carry a heavy presumption of an unconstitutional prior
restraint").
277. See United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596,
599 (6th Cir. 1987); Mechem, 801 F.2d at 1236; Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985); CBS,
Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975); Breiner v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637, 641 (Haw. 1992).
278. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
279. Id. at 240.
280. Id. at 236.
281. Id. at 239-40.
282. 830 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1987).
283. Id. at 597.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 599.
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JournalPublishing Co. v. Mechem,286 and the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Salameh,287 also held that trial participant gag orders are prior restraints.2 8
Other courts do not follow this line of reasoning, holding that gag orders directed
at trial participants are not prior restraints on speech. 28 9 RTNA v. United States
DistrictCourt"g represents an example of a case where the court refused to analyze
the gag order as a prior restraint on speech.2 9' In RTNA, the Radio and Television
News Association (RTNA) challenged the gag order on trial participants in a
criminal case for a defendant charged with espionage.292 The Ninth Circuit held that
the media's interest in interviewing trial participants was "outside the scope of
protection offered by the first amendment" and was not "a sufficient interest to
establish an infringement of freedom of the press."293
In some cases, determining whether a gag order directed at a trial participant is
a prior restraint depends on whether the news media or the trial participants
themselves challenge the order. 2 4 While the Ninth Circuit in RTNA held that a gag
order directed at trial participants was not a prior restraint, 295 the Ninth Circuit in
Levine v. UnitedStates DistrictCourt2 96 found that a gag order directed at attorneys
and parties in the case was a prior restraint. 297 The difference is that the trial
participants themselves challenged the gag order in Levine,295 while the news media
challenged the gag order in RTNTA. 2 99 The Second Circuit approaches gag orders on
trial participants the same way as the Ninth Circuit."re
The distinction between whether the news media or the trial participant
challenges the gag order leads some courts to conclude that trial participant gag
orders are less offensive than news media gag orders because the media is not being
directly prevented from publishing or broadcasting information."1 As a result, courts

286. 801 F.2d 1233 (10thCir. 1986).
287. 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993).
288. Id. at 446 (holding that "[a]n order that prohibits the utterance or publication of particular information
or commentary imposes a 'prior restraint' on speech"); Mechem, 801 F.2d at 1236 (holding that "any inhibitions
against news coverage of a trial carry a heavy presumption of an unconstitutional prior restraint").
289. In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d 603,608-09 (2d Cir. 1988); RTNA v. U.S. Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1447
(9th Cir. 1986).
290. 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986).
291. Id. at 1447.
292. Id.at 1444.
293. Id. at 1447.
294. See infra notes 295-299 and accompanying text. CompareLevine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590,595
(9th Cir. 1985), with RTNA, 781 F.2d at 1447; compare In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 609, with Salameh, 992 F.2d
at 446.
295. RTNA, 781 F.2d at 1447.
296. 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985).
297. Id.at 595.
298. Id.
299. RTNA, 781 F.2d at 1447.
300. CompareIn re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 609, with Salameh, 992 F.2d at 446. In In re Dow Jones, the
Second Circuit held that "there is a substantial difference between a restraining order directed against the press-a
form of censorship which the First Amendment sought to abolish from these shores-and [an] order.. directed
solely against trial participants and challenged only by the press." 842 F.2d at 608. The difference between the
Second Circuit's holding in In re Dow Jones and its holding in Salameh was that the news media challenged the
gag order in In re Dow Jones, while the defense attorney challenged the order in Salameh. Id. at 609; Salameh, 992
F.2d at 446; see supranote 288.
301. See In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608-09; Gauthier, supra note 9.
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that do not recognize trial participant gag orders as prior restraints do not subject
gag orders to the heightened scrutiny required of prior restraints. 0 2 When courts do
not analyze trial participant gag orders as prior restraints, this increases the chance
that these gag orders will be upheld and that courts will continue to use them as a
tool to control prejudicial pretrial publicity.
The conflict in appellate courts over whether a gag order directed at a trial
participant is a prior restraint has created uncertainty as to which approach is
correct.0 3 It appears that jurisdictions will continue to apply a variety of approaches
to the issue until the U.S. Supreme Court decides whether a trial participant gag
order is a prior restraint on speech. 3 4 Until then, the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Twohig has made its decision on the issue, opting to characterize trial participant
gag orders as a prior restraint, the same as a gag order imposed on the news
media."'
2. New Mexico's Choice: Trial Participant Gag Orders Are Prior Restraints
While the New Mexico Supreme Court in Twohig did not specify why it characterized a gag order on trial participants as a prior restraint, the court was right to
do so because the effect a gag order has on trial participants is similar to the effect
of a gag order on the news media.3" 6 That effect is to restrict information that the
news media can report.30 7 The New Mexico Supreme Court's defmition of a prior
restraint supports the assertion that a gag order directed at the media and a gag order
directed at trial participants produce similar effects on the dissemination of
information by the media.30 8 In Twohig, the New Mexico Supreme Court defined the
gag order as a prior restraint because it was "an order.. .which prohibit[ed] trial
participants from speaking with anyone about the case." 3 9 In other words, it
prohibited speech before it could be spoken, thus limiting the information available
to the news media and restraining the news media in advance of publication or
broadcast.310
The court's finding in Twohig is further supported by the Second Circuit's
decision in In re Dow Jones.3 t ' Despite refusing to define a trial participant gag
order as a prior restraint, the Second Circuit in Dow Jones recognized that the effect

302. See United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415,425 (5th Cir. 2000); RTNA, 781 F.2d at 1447. In Brown, the
Fifth Circuit found that gag orders on trial participants are evaluated under a "less stringent" standard than gag
orders on the news media. Brown, 218 F.3d at 425. Still, the Fifth Circuit recognized that gag orders on litigants
"still exhibit the characteristics of prior restraints." Id. at 424.
303. See Chemerinsky, supranote 5, at 319.
304. id.

305. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 13, 918 P.2d at 335.
306. See In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608. The Second Circuit recognized that restricting the flow of
information to the media has an effect similar to that of a prior restraint on the media. Id. Despite this recognition,
the court in In re Dow Jones ultimately concluded that a gag order directed at trial participants is less intrusive of
First Amendment rights than one aimed at the press. Id.; see Young, 522 F.2d at 239; see also Gauthier, supra note
9.
307. See Young, 522 F.2d at 239; Bjork, supranote 35, at 183.
308. See In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608; Young, 522 F.2d at 239; Gauthier, supra note 9.
309. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 13, 918 P.2d at 335.
310. In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608; Young, 522 F.2d at 239; Bjork, supra note 35, at 183.
311. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988).
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of trial participant gag orders is similar to gagging the media.3 2 The Second Circuit
found that a gag order directed at trial participants "limits the flow of information
readily available to the news agencies-and for that reason might have an effect
similar to that of a prior restraint."3" 3
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of a prior restraint in Nebraska
Press Ass 'n also provides support for the idea that the practical result of a trial
participant gag order is also to gag the press.314 The Court defined a prior restraint
on speech as an "order[] that prohibit[s] the publication or broadcast of particular
information or commentary., 315 When a trial participant is restricted from speaking
about the case to the media, this is in fact limiting the "publication or broadcast of
particular information or commentary., 316 Trial participants often have their own
opinion about whether justice is being done. 3 7 But that commentary, and any
information the trial participant has about the trial, cannot be shared with the media
when a gag order is imposed. This in turn limits the media to reporting information
they can obtain from observing a trial, without the benefit of being able to speak to
those who may have the most knowledge about the case. 18
Without the ability to interview credible sources of information participating in
the trial, such as the attorneys, the flow of accurate information to the news media,
and thus the public, is restricted, creating the same effect as a gag order on the
media.319 The Sixth Circuit in Young agreed with this line of reasoning. 32 "Although
the news media are not directly enjoined from discussing the case, it is apparent that
significant and meaningful sources of information concerning the case are
effectively removed from them and their representatives. To that extent their
protected right to obtain information concerning the trial is curtailed and
impaired., 32' Trial participants have information that may not have been discussed
in the courtroom but that may be relevant to the public.322 By not allowing trial
participants to speak to the media about this information and by restricting
participants' ability to present their version of courtroom events, a gag order restricts

312. Id. at 608. The Fifth Circuit has also recognized that gag orders on trial participants share similar
characteristics as prior restraints. United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 424 (5th Cir. 2000).
313. In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608. Although recognizing the similar effect of gagging trial participants,
the Second Circuit went on to hold that a gag order directed at trial participants is less intrusive of First Amendment
rights than a gag order on the news media. Id.
314. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
315. Id. at 556.
316. Id.
317. See Todd, supranote 54, at 1199.
318. RTNA, 781 F.2d at 1446-47 (recognizing that the press has a "right of access" to trials or "right to gather
information" about trials, but holding that the press has no greater privilege than the right to attend the trial and
report on their observations). The Ninth Circuit held that "the 'right to gather information' does not include a
constitutional 'right' to understand what has been gathered." Id. at 1446 n.3. The court found that the press must
rely on its own resources to interpret the information they obtain at criminal proceedings. Id.; see Gentile, 501 U.S.
at 1056-57 (plurality) (Kennedy, J.) (arguing that lawyers are credible sources of information that the press and
public rely upon for information); Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 312.
319. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1057 (arguing that attorneys are among the most reliable sources of accurate
trial information); PEMBER, supra note 24, at 423 (stating that "it would be better.. to provide journalists... with
accurate.. .statements rather than push them to report what is ground out by a rumor mill").
320. Young, 522 F.2d at 239.
321. Id.
322. Todd, supranote 54, at 1199.
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the media's ability to tell the public about trials.323 This creates an effect similar to
a gag order that directly prohibits the media from publishing or broadcasting and,
therefore, is properly characterized as a prior restraint.324
By characterizing a trial participant gag order as a prior restraint, the New Mexico
Supreme Court did not foreclose the possibility of imposing gag orders on trial
participants; it simply required heightened scrutiny when analyzing such an order.32
When analyzing a trial participant gag order as a prior restraint, there must be a
"clear and imminent danger," also described as a "serious and imminent threat," to
the administration of justice in a court proceeding, and the gag order must be
narrowly tailored, not overbroad or vague. 326 These requirements impose a heavy
burden of demonstrating justification for imposing a prior restraint.327 The First
Amendment was intended to prohibit the government from imposing prior restraints
on freedom of speech and freedom of the press,328 and, therefore, it is correct to
analyze prior restraints, including gag orders directed at trial participants under this
heightened level of scrutiny.329
B. Using the "ClearandPresentDanger"Standardto Analyze Attorney Speech
When the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a gag order directed at an
attorney was a prior restraint on speech,330 thus requiring a "clear and present
" ' its ruling was consistent with New
danger" to the administration of justice,33
Mexico's rule regarding trial publicity in a criminal proceeding, which also
incorporates a "clear and present danger" standard.33 2 The "clear and present danger"
standard is the more protective standard for attorney speech,333 and it is also the
more appropriate standard for analyzing gag orders directed at trial participants.334
As previously discussed, not all courts are in agreement as to what standard
should apply in analyzing attorney speech. 335 Gentile v. State Bar336 makes it clear
that attorney speech can be regulated under a less protective standard: "substantial

323. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 323.
324. See In re Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608; Young, 522 F.2d at 239; Gauthier, supra note 9.
325. See Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 13, 918 P.2d at 335-36 (holding that a "prior restraint requires special
judicial attention"); see supra text accompanying note 28.
326. Mechem, 801 F.2d at 1236; Young, 522 F.2d at 239-40.
327. Neb. PressAss 'n, 527 U.S. at 558; see Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 13, 918 P.2d at 335-36.
328. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931) (holding that the "chief purpose of the
guaranty [of liberty of the press is] to prevent previous restraints upon publication"); PEMBER, supra note 24, at
64-65.
329. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 322-23.
330. Twohig, i996-N-MSC-023, i 3, 918 P.2d at 335.
331. Mechem, 801 F.2d at 1236; Young, 522 F.2d at 240.
332. Rule 16-306 NMRA. The rule states in part that "[a] lawyer shall not make any extrajudicial...
statement.. .that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know...creates a clear and present danger of prejudicing
the proceeding." Id. Rule 16-308 describes special responsibilities of a prosecutor in a criminal case, including
"exercis[ing] reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons
assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the
prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 16-306." Rule 16-308 NMRA.
333. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1070-71.
334. See infra notes 348-357 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part ll.E.
336. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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likelihood of material prejudice."3'37 However, it is worth noting that Gentile did not
address the standard that applies to prior restraints on trial participants.33 That case
only dealt with the standard for after-the-fact punishment of attorney speech and
whether Gentile's statements had violated the rule of professional conduct on trial
publicity.339 There was no gag order in Gentile.34 Even so, the New Mexico
Supreme Court, thus far, has chosen not to change the current standard to the
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard" in Gentile,34 which is also
incorporated in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.342 The court has
maintained the "clear and present danger" standard incorporated in Rule 16-306."' 3
Unfortunately, the New Mexico Supreme Court's language in Twohig did not
take the position that the "clear and present danger" standard is more protective than
the "substantial likelihood" standard. 3 " In fact, the court in Twohig stated that the
standards may be only semantically different, 345 and then implied that the
articulation of the standard was less important than the balancing inquiry that takes
place when analyzing restrictions on attorney speech.346 Still, although the New
Mexico Supreme Court did not find the difference to be significant, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Gentile held that the "substantial likelihood" standard is a "less
demanding standard., 347 Therefore, based on the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation, the "clear and present danger" standard incorporates more protection for
attorney speech in New Mexico.
It is more appropriate to analyze attorney speech under the "clear and present
danger" standard in light of the court's ruling in Twohig that an order that gags trial
participants is a prior restraint. 34' A prior restraint triggers a "heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity" and therefore is subject to heightened scrutiny.349
Nebraska Press Ass'n incorporated the "clear and present danger" standard in
analyzing a prior restraint directed at the news media.350 Considering that the effect

337. Id. at 1075.
338. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 316. The State Bar of Nevada punished Gentile for violating the Nevada
trial publicity rule. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033. Gentile addressed whether the "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" standard was constitutionally permissible to determine if an attorney's comments violated the trial
publicity rule of professional conduct. Id. at 1062-63. The court did not determine the standard for analyzing a prior
restraint on the attorney speech. See id. at 1062-63.
339. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1062-63.
340. See id.at 1030.
341. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 16,918 P.2d at 337. The court in Twohig pointed out that the New Mexico
Supreme Court amended its trial publicity rule after Gentile was decided, but the court adopted the "clear and
present danger" standard, not the "substantial likelihood" standard that was endorsed in Gentile. Id.
342. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2004).
343. Rule 16-306 NMRA.
344. See Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 16, 918 P.2d at 337.
345. Id. In Gentile, Justice Kennedy, writing in a separate opinion for four justices, found the difference in
the standards to be "mere semantics." Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1037.
346. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 16, 918 P.2d at 337.
347. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074.
348. See Mechem, 801 F.2d at 1236 (finding a prior restraint and holding that, "[i]f a court order burdens
constitutional rights and the action proscribed by the order presents no clear and imminent danger to the
administration of justice, the order is constitutionally impermissible"); Young, 522 F.2d at 240 (ruling that prior
restraints "cannot escape the proscriptions of the First Amendment, unless it is shown to have been required to
obviate serious and imminent threats to the fairness and integrity of the trial").
349. Neb. Press Ass 'n, 427 U.S. at 558.
350. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1069.
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of a gag order, whether directed at the press or at trial participants, is to limit the
flow of information to the public,35' it follows that the "clear and present danger"
standard would be more applicable in dealing with trial participant speech.352
Other courts have adopted this approach, opting to follow NebraskaPressAss 'n
and the use of the "clear and present danger" standard when analyzing gag orders
directed at trial participants.353 Bearing in mind that prior restraints are an
extraordinary measure and presumptively invalid, 3 4 Gentile's less demanding
"substantial likelihood" standard does not provide the same protection for trial
participant speech.3 5 Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that the "substantial
likelihood" standard is sufficient,35 6 New Mexico is not required to adopt the Gentile
standard357 and, by maintaining the use of "clear and present danger," New Mexico
guarantees a more protective environment for attorney speech.
While the court in Twohig did not take a strong stance on the issue of which
standard is more appropriate, the court still implemented the requirement that a trial
court must balance the interests at stake, holding that the inquiry remained the same
regardless of what standard was incorporated. 35" By requiring a balancing of
interests, the Twohig decision requires trial courts to look at a series of factors359 and
issue specific findings of fact before imposing a gag order.36
C. Requirement of FactualFindings
The holding of the court in Twohig requiring specific factual findings in
determining the necessity of a gag order is crucial in striking the balance between
a defendant's right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and the right
to free speech, safeguarded by the First Amendment.3 6' The requirement of specific
factual fmdings forces judges to carefully balance the right to free speech and a
defendant's right to a fair trial, instead ofmaking general conclusions about the need
for a gag order. 362 Trial judges must analyze the facts supporting the conclusion that
a gag order is necessary.363 Requiring judges to engage in this analysis adds another
layer of protection for trial participant speech in New Mexico.

351. See supra notes 306-313, 319-324 and accompanying text.
352. See Young, 522 F.2d at 239 (finding a prior restraint and applying a clear and present danger standard
where the news media's access to "meaningful" sources of information is restricted). The court in Young held that
"[t]he protected right to publish the news would be of little value in the absence of sources from which to obtain
it."Id.at 238.
353. Mechem, 801 F.2d at 1236; Young, 522 F.2d at 238.
354. Neb. PressAss "n, 427 U.S. at 558.
355. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074.
356. Id. at 1075.
357. Id. at 1074. The Court's holding in Gentile that "the speech of lawyers...may be regulated under a less
demanding standard" reflects that states are free to decide which standard to use in regulating attorney speech. Id.
(emphasis added).
358. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 16, 918 P.2d at 337.
359. Id. 1 17, 918 P.2d at 337; see supra text accompanying note 245.
360. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 1,918 P.2d at 333.
361. Id. ll,918P.2dat335.
362. See Neb. PressAss 'n, 427 U.S. at 562-63; Chase, 435 F.2d at 1061; Kemner, 492 N.E.2d at 1337;
Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 26, 918 P.2d at 340.
363. See Neb. PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 562-63; Chase, 435 F.2d at 1061; Kemner, 492 N.E.2d at 1337;
Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 26, 918 P.2d at 340.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court demonstrated the importance ofjudges making
specific factual findings to justify gag orders on trial participants by striking down
the gag order in Twohig.36 There is no doubt that the Gordon House case was one
of the most publicized trials in New Mexico history.365 In House's appeal to the New
Mexico Supreme Court, the court acknowledged the pervasive and extensive
publicity associated with the case.366 Yet, the court in Twohig refused367to accept the
general conclusions of the trial judge that a gag order was necessary.
While it was well known that the unprecedented publicity in the House case
resulted in two venue changes,368 the court found that the gag order was
unconstitutional because it lacked specific findings supporting the conclusion that
there was a "clear and present danger" to a fair trial.369 The New Mexico Supreme
Court made it clear that regardless of how much publicity is associated with a case,
unless the trial judges make specific factual findings demonstrating a "clear and
present danger" to a fair trial, a gag order will not be imposed.370
The requirement of findings to show a "clear and present danger" to a fair trial
flows from the idea set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gentile and Nebraska
Press Ass 'n that "[o]nly the occasional case presents a danger of prejudice from
pretrial publicity. '37' Gag orders on trial participants are often based on the assumption that pretrial publicity automatically leads to an unfair trial or a conviction for
defendants. 372 The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected that assumption by
requiring a showing of specific facts, not general conclusions, that pretrial
373 publicity
resulted in a "clear and present danger" of prejudicing the proceeding.
D. Less RestrictiveAlternatives
Another example of the New Mexico Supreme Court's protection of trial
participant speech is the holding in Twohig requiring judges to consider less

364. See Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 126, 918 P.2d at 340.
365. House, 1999-NMSC-014, 1j8, 978 P.2d at 973; see supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
366. House, 1999-NMSC-0 14, I 2, 13, 57, 978 P.2d at 972, 974, 985.
367. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 26, 918 P.2d at 340.
12, 20, 978 P.2d at 974, 975.
368. House, 1999-NMSC-014,
369. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 1,918 P.2d at 333.
370. See id. 28, 918 P.2d at 341.
371. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1054; see Neb. PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 565 (holding that pervasive pretrial publicity
is not considered to automatically lead to an unfair trial). The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Fordalso agreed,
stating, "Trial judges, the government, the lawyers and the public must tolerate robust and at times acrimonious or
even silly public debate about litigation." 830 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1987).
372. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 312. High profile cases like the rape trial of William Kennedy Smith and
the O.J. Simpson murder trial resulted in acquittals for the defendants, rebutting the assumption that pretrial
publicity automatically results in a conviction. Id. Also, the first two trials of Gordon House did not result in a
conviction for the most serious charges of vehicular homicide. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, If 7-8, 918 P.2d at 334.
It is unclear what effect, if any, pretrial publicity has on a defendant's right to a fair trial. Some research suggests
jurors are able to disregard prejudicial trial publicity. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1055-56; Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at
312. One study showed that relatively few convictions were overturned because of prejudicial publicity, and defense
attorneys rarely raised the issue on appeal. Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-JudiciaryRelations:
What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the FairTrial-FreePress Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15 (1989)
(discussing study conducted from 1976 to 1980 by Professor Dale Spencer). Another study found that juror bias
caused by news coverage might only occur in one out of every 10,000 cases. Id. at 16.
373. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 26, 918 P.2d at 340.
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restrictive alternatives than a prior restraint on speech. 374 In Nebraska PressAss 'n,
the U.S. Supreme Court's three-prong test for analyzing gag orders directed at the
media included a prong that required consideration of less restrictive alternatives.375
Because the effect of a gag order on a trial participant is the same as a gag order on
the media, and because a trial participant gag order is considered a prior restraint,
this analysis applies with equal force in this context.376 By requiring judges to
examine less restrictive alternatives, like a change of venue or extensive voir dire,377
the New Mexico Supreme Court created a substantial hurdle to cross before a gag
order can be imposed.378
If a judge considers all potential less restrictive alternatives, it is unlikely that he
or she would be able to find that none of those alternatives would be effective in
addressing trial publicity.379 The court in NebraskaPressAss 'n found that there was
insufficient evidence to show that other alternatives would not have protected the
defendant's right to a fair trial in that case.380 In addition, it would be difficult to
argue that if those alternatives, such as change of venue, sequestration of the jury,
and extensive voir dire, would not prevent prejudicial pretrial publicity, that a prior
restraint would be any more effective.38'
In Nebraska Press Ass 'n, the Supreme Court expressly adopted a standard that
allows a prior restraint to be imposed only if it would be workable and effective in
protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial.382 The court in Nebraska Press Ass 'n
recognized the difficulties trial judges encounter when dealing with gag orders,
including "problems of managing and enforcing pre-trial restraining orders. 38 3
Oftentimes, leaks and violations undermine the effectiveness of the gag order. 3' For
example, despite a gag order prohibiting trial participants from speaking to the
media in United States v. Koubriti,385 the nation's highest law enforcement official,
Attorney General John Ashcroft, violated the gag order by talking about the case on
two separate occasions. 386

374. Id.
375. Id. at 562; see supra text accompanying note 52.
376. See supra Part V.A.
377. For example, despite the extensive trial publicity surrounding the House case, the court noted that less
restrictive measures were employed during the first and second trials, including a change of venue to Taos and
extensive voir dire. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 27, 918 P.2d at 340. The court in Twohig found that jurors in the
third trial were extensively questioned about whether they knew anything about the case, drinking and driving,
migraines, and any racial stereotypes about Native Americans. Id. Further, there was evidence that, despite the
amount of publicity surrounding the case in Albuquerque, residents of Taos knew very little about the case. Id.
(citing Ed Asher, GordonHouse? Wo "sThat? Taos Asks, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., June 7, 1994).
378. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 328 (arguing that a judge who considers less restrictive alternatives
would have a difficult time justifying why none of them would work).
379. Id.
380. Neb. PressAss n,427 U.S. at 569.
381. Chemerinsky, supranote 5, at 330.
382. Neb. PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 565.
383. Id.
384. Gauthier, supra note 9.
385. 305 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Koubriti involved the trial of three Middle Eastern men on
terrorism-related charges.
386. Id. at 725. The defendants in Koubritimotioned the court to impose contempt sanctions on the Attorney
General. Id. The court declined to do so, holding that the violation was not willful, and instead chose to publicly
admonish the Attorney General. Id. at 742, 764-65.
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Another problem involving the management and enforcement of gag orders is
that, even when a gag order is issued, rumors can surface, and these rumors may be
"more damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts. ' 38 Media coverage of
high profile cases does not end when a gag order is issued.8 8 Limiting the sources
of information
for reporters may cause the news media to turn to less accurate
389
sources.

No gag order against the news media has been upheld under the test articulated
in NebraskaPressAss 'n.3' 9 By incorporating a requirement that trial courts consider
less restrictive alternatives, the New Mexico Supreme Court imposed a heavy
burden that must be overcome in order to impose a gag order on trial participants,
especially considering the difficulty in showing that all other alternatives are not
effective. 39 ' This provides further speech protection for trial participants in New
Mexico.
In summary, the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Twohig provided
broad protection for trial participant speech in New Mexico by creating a high
burden that must be overcome before a gag order can be imposed on trial participants. 392 This burden is evidenced by the court's decision to analyze a gag order on
trial participants as a prior restraint,393 which invokes a heavy presumption against
the validity of the order.394 In view of the court's decision to recognize trial
participant gag orders as prior restraints, the "clear and present danger" standard is
the more appropriate standard to analyze attorney speech, even though the New
Mexico Supreme Court failed to recognize the standard as more protective.395 In
addition, by requiring judges to make specific factual findings and consider less
restrictive alternatives before imposing a gag order on trial participants, the court
created additional obstacles that must be overcome before a gag order may be
imposed on trial participants.396 While these obstacles are not impossible to
overcome, Twohig provides safeguards to ensure that gag orders on trial participants
are imposed only when absolutely necessary.

387. Neb. PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 567.
388. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 313.
389. Id. One commentator argues that it would be better to provide journalists with accurate information than
to push them to report rumors. PEMBER, supranote 24, at 423. In Gentile, Justice Kennedy also argued that allowing
attorneys to comment on cases might actually be a value to the bar because attorneys are well informed about the
case. 501 U.S. at 1056-57.
390. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 328. While the U.S. Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Ass "ndid not
expressly state that it was creating an outright ban on gag orders directed at the news media, the result has been
similar. Id.
391. See supra notes 379-381 and accompanying text. There is criticism about the effectiveness of less
restrictive alternatives to gag orders. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. Writing for the majority in Gentile, Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that, while less restrictive alternatives, like change of venue or voir dire, can ensure a fair
trial, there are problems with the use of these alternatives. Id. The Court stated that even using extensive voir dire
may not be sufficient to offset the pretrial publicity, and a change of venue also may not make up for the pretrial
publicity, in light of pervasive media coverage. Id.; see also Jaime N. Morris, The Anonymous Accused: Protecting
Defendants' Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REv. 901, 924-32 (2003).
392. See Twohig v. Blaclaer, 1996-NMSC-023, 918 P.2d 332.
393. Id. 13, 918 P.2d at 335.
394. Id. 13, 918 P.2d at 336.
395. See supra Part V.B.
396. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 26, 918 P.2d at 340.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Twohig raises two important
issues regarding free speech in New Mexico. First, attorney Ray Twohig argued that
as defense counsel he had a right to speak to the news media in order to defend his
client from statements made by the prosecution.397 Since the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial is at stake in a criminal prosecution, this brings up
the question of whether regulating defense attorney speech is necessary, and whether
defense attorney freespeech rights should not be ifringed upon.39
Second, the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Twohig raises the question
of how broadly the free speech and free press provision of New Mexico's
Constitution should be interpreted. Attorney Ray Twohig claimed the gag order that
prevented him from speaking to the news media violated his free speech rights, not
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but instead, under article II,
section 17 of the New Mexico Constitution. 3" The court in Twohig agreed, holding
that the gag order in Twohig violated article H, section 17.'0 Other states with
similar free speech provisions as New Mexico's have found that their state
constitutions provide greater protection than the First Amendment, and in one
context, so has New Mexico.' This brings up the issue of whether the free speech
provision of New Mexico's Constitution can be interpreted more broadly than the
U.S. Constitution to provide more protection for trial participant speech in light of
the court's analysis in Twohig.
A. Regulating Defense Attorney Speech: Is It Necessary?
The debate over the necessity of regulating attorney speech played out in Gentile
v. State Bar402 between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. In Gentile,
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that lawyers have a responsibility not to make outof-court statements that will pose a threat to a fair trial. 4 3 In addition, the Court held
that the lawyers' extrajudicial comments may be seen as more authoritative, since
lawyers have access to more information./' However, Justice Kennedy took a
different view in Gentile, stating that regulating attorney speech requires strict First
Amendment protections.40 5

397. Id. 10, 918 P.2d at 335.
398. See infra Part VLA.
399. Twohig. 1996-NMSC-023, 1 1,918 P.2d at 333.
400. Id.
401. See People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) ("[O]ur constitution extends broader
protection to freedom of expression than does the first amendment to the United States Constitution."); City of
Farmington v. Fawcett, 114 N.M. 537; 546, 843 P.2d 839, 848-49 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the New Mexico
Constitution required a broader standard for demonstrating obscenity than what the U.S. Constitution required,
relying heavily on the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Ford,773 P.2d 1059); Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs,
759 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1988) ("[T]he rights of free speech and press guaranteed by our Texas Constitution are
more extensive than those guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.").
402. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
403. Id. at 1074 (quoting Neb. PressAss 'n, 427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1055.
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There is doubt as to whether regulating defense attorney speech is necessary to
protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.4" 6 In Twohig, defense attorney Ray Twohig
40 7
argued that he had a right to counter statements made by the district attorney.
Twohig argued that the district attorney's statements "created a strong sentiment
against the Defendant in the public arena. 40 8 Prosecutor statements are a concern
for defense attorneys, and some argue that they need to be able to reply to the
charges against their clients.4 °9
Several courts have held that regulating attorney speech is far more questionable
when restrictions are placed on defense attorneys.41 0 In Gentile, Justice Kennedy
questioned the need to regulate defense attorney speech at all.411 Justice Kennedy
wrote, "An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door.... A defense
attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or
reduction of charges, including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of public
opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried."'"2 Justice Kennedy pointed out
that the government in a criminal case has multiple means of publicizing information that is adverse to a defendant, which puts the defense at a disadvantage to be
able to counter government statements.4 3 Justice Kennedy cited the lack of evidence
demonstrating that defense attorneys actually prejudice the prosecution's case.4" 4
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in UnitedStates v. Ford15 agreed that a defendant has
an "interest in replying to... adverse publicity."'"6 In turn, the Sixth Circuit
recognized that the public also has a right to hear what the defense has to say, since
the public has an interest in ensuring that justice is being served." 7 Justice Kennedy
agreed that there are times when making out-of-court statements to the news media
may be "necessary to protect the rights of the client and prevent abuse of the
courts.' ' 8 The U.S. Supreme Court in NebraskaPressAss 'n v. Stuart4 19 also agreed
that "protection against prior restraint should have particular force as applied to
reporting of criminal proceedings.""
In Twohig, Ray Twohig argued that both the district attorney and his assistants
made "misleading and inaccurate statements" about the case.42 New Mexico's ethics
rules add special responsibilities on prosecutors to ensure that investigators, law
enforcement officials, and other persons assisting the prosecution in criminal cases

406. See id.
407. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 10, 918 P.2d at 335.
408. Id.
409. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1058; Ford,830 F.2d at 599.
410. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1055; Ford,830 F.2d at 599.
411. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1055.
412. Id. at 1043.
413. Id. at 1056.
414. Id. at 1055 (discussing that respondent and its amici did not present evidence of any situations where
a defense attorney prejudiced the State's case, and noting the "absence of anecdotal or survey evidence in a muchstudied area of the law").
415. 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987).
416. Id. at 599.
417. Id.
418. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1058.
419. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
420. Id. at 559.
421. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1 10, 918 P.2d at 335.
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do not make extrajudicial comments that are false or that present a "clear and
present danger of prejudicing the proceeding.""22 Still, prosecutors often have more
contact with the news media than defense attorneys.423 One study found that,
because prosecutors have more frequent contact with reporters, prosecutors have the
ability "to influence journalists' agendas." 24 In contrast, as Justice Kennedy noted
in Gentile, "a defendant cannot
speak without fear of incriminating himself and
25
prejudicing his defense.9A
It is important to note that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is
not the only consideration for the court in addressing pretrial publicity. Courts also
recognize the public's right to a fair trial426 and the state's interest in the fair
administration of justice. 27 The government's interest in a fair trial stems in part
from U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 4 28 In Singer v. UnitedStates, 429 the Court held
that "the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in
which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the
Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.""30
While the Supreme Court recognized that the government does have an interest
in a fair trial, the Sixth Circuit found that, in cases involving gag orders, the
government's interest is more limited than the defendant's interest in a right to a fair
trial.431'The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Ford3 2 noted that the Sixth Amendment
and First Amendment protect individuals, not the government. 433 The court in Ford
noted the availability of less restrictive alternatives if the "ability of the government
to try the defendant in a 'fair' forum" is threatened.43 4 "To the extent that publicity
is a disadvantage for the government, the government must tolerate it. The
government is our servant, not our master. ' 35 Not all courts have the same opinion.
The Fifth Circuit specifically disagreed with the Sixth Circuit in United States v.

422. Rule 16-308 NMRA; Rule 16-306 NMRA; see supratext accompanying note 139.
423. Drechsel, supranote 372, at 26.
424. Id.
425. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1056. Justice Kennedy also noted that most defendants cannot afford to hire a public
relations team to counter extrajudicial statements made by prosecutors. Id.
426. In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 363-64
(4th Cir. 1979)).
427. United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). The government interest stems from Article
II of the U.S. Constitution, which charges the executive branch to ensure that the "laws are faithfully executed" to
produce a fair result in a prosecution. United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987); U.S. CONST. art.
11("[The President] shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.").
428. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
429. 380 U.S. 24 (1965). Singer involved a challenge to a federal rule of criminal procedure that did not
permit a defendant to waive a jury trial in a federal criminal case unless the prosecution and the court consented.
Id. at 24-25. The Court upheld the rule. Id. at 37.
430. Id. at 36. ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 3-1.2(c) supports the notion of the state's interest in
fairness, stating that the "duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict." ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIM. JUSTICE 3-1.2(c) (1993).

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
gag order

See Ford,830 F.2d at 600 n.l.
830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 600.
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 52.
Ford,830 F.2d at 600. The Sixth Circuit stated that, while more publicity may result in a case where a
is not imposed, this does not necessarily produce an unfair trial for the government. Id.
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Brown,436 stating that the court was "incorrect. ' 43 7 Still, the Sixth Circuit in Ford
is "at a peak"
found that the defendant's interest in responding to adverse publicity
4 3
when the "full power of the government" is against the defendant. 1
In conclusion, the court in Twohig did not address whether a distinction should
be drawn in regulating prosecutor speech and defense attorney speech.439 The
necessity of restricting defense attorneys from speaking to the media is not clear,
especially when it might be necessary for attorneys to speak to the media to protect
their clients. Although Justice Kennedy discussed this in Gentile, advocating for
careful scrutiny of restrictions on defense attorney speech, the majority of the
Supreme Court did not agree."' Courts often apply trial participant gag orders to
both parties equally."' Arguably, however, there are reasons why a court could
make a distinction and determine that defense attorney speech should not be
regulated. Some of those reasons include the defendant's interest in replying to
adverse publicity, the public's interest in hearing what the defendant has to say, and
the prosecutors' ability to influence journalists as a result of more frequent contact
with the news media.
B. New Mexico's Free Speech Provision: GreaterProtection Than the First
Amendment?
The argument that New Mexico's Constitution provides greater protection for
free speech and free press rights did not arise in Twohig. However, by basing part
of its decision in Twohig on article II, section 17 of the New Mexico Constitution,
rather than the First Amendment, the question arises whether the New Mexico
Supreme Court might recognize greater protection for trial participant speech under
the New Mexico Constitution in future gag order cases."42 The New Mexico Court
of Appeals may have already taken the first step by providing broader protection for
free speech under the New Mexico Constitution in the context of obscenity
standards." 3 Other states with similar constitutional provisions have also found

436. 218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000).
437. Id. at 424 n.9.
438. Ford, 830 F.2d at 599. While it is not clear from case law whether the defendant's right to a fair trial
outweighs the government's interest, it appears that both interests should be considered when courts balance the
interests at stake in determining whether to impose a gag order on trial participants. Brown, 218 F.3d at 424 n.9.
439. Twohig v. Blackmer, 1996-NMSC-023, 918 P.2d 332.
440. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1055-56.
441. See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445,446 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Levine v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 764 P.2d 590, 593 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir. 1969).
442. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023,1 1,918 P.2d at 333; see San Antonio Express-News v. Roman, 861 S.W.2d
265, 267 (Tex. App. 1993) (choosing to base its decision on the Texas Constitution because it provides greater
protection for free speech). In State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 1 20, 932 P.2d 1, 7, the New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted an interstitial approach to interpreting the New Mexico Constitution. Under this approach, the first
question is whether the asserted right is protected under the U.S. Constitution. Id. 1 19, 932 P.2d at 7. If it is not
protected under the federal constitution, the court will turn to the state constitution. Id. The court will provide
broader protection under the New Mexico Constitution when it finds that federal analysis is "flawed," or when there
are "distinctive state characteristics," or when there are "undeveloped federal analogs." Id. 1 20, 932 P.2d at 7.
443. State v. Rendleman, 2003-NMCA-150, T1 57-58, 82 P.3d 554, 569-70 (reaffirming the New Mexico
Court of Appeals' interpretation that the New Mexico Constitution is broader than the First Amendment with regard
to content-based restrictions); City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 114 N.M. 537, 546, 843. P.2d 839, 848 (Ct. App.
1992).
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greater protection for free speech under their state constitutions. 4 " In light of the
New Mexico Supreme Court's broad protection for trial participant speech in
Twohig, the question of greater protection under article II, section 17 appears to be
legitimate.
The groundwork for a claim of greater protection under article II, section 17 may
have been laid down in City ofFarmington v. Fawcett,"5 where the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held that New Mexico's Constitution is more protective of free
speech in the context of obscenity standards." 6 In Fawcett, a case involving the
prosecution of a man accused of violating a city obscenity ordinance, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that the New Mexico Constitution required a broader
standard for demonstrating obscenity than what the U.S. Constitution required, thus
providing more protection for free speech.4 7 New Mexico can determine the scope
of the rights guaranteed in the New Mexico Constitution. 4 The court in Fawcett
pointed out that, while state constitutions may not provide less protection than the
U.S. Constitution, states are free to provide greater protection. 449 In State v.
Rendleman,50 the New Mexico Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding that the
New Mexico Constitution is interpreted more broadly than the First Amendment in
free speech, at least in the context of obscenity. 5' In light of Fawcett and
Rendleman, the scope of article II, section 17's protection of free speech appears to
be broad, at least in certain contexts. 52
The textual difference between the free speech provision of the New Mexico
Constitution and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provided a basis for
the court's conclusion in Fawcett.453 The court of appeals observed that there was
a difference in the language of the two provisions; although the court noted that the
New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized article II, section 17 as being "similar"
to the First Amendment. 45 4 Still, the court in Fawcettdetermined that even when the
language is identical, which is not the case in New Mexico, states "may find greater
protection under their state constitutions.'455 The court went on to say that the
authors of the New Mexico Constitution knowingly chose to adopt different language than that of the First Amendment. 56

444. See People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Colo. 1989); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex.
1992); Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs, 759 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1988).
445. 114 N.M. 537, 843 P.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1992).
446. Id. at 546-47, 843 P.2d at 848-49.
447. Id. at 546, 843 P.2d at 848.
448. Id. at 544, 843 P.2d at 846 (citing State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989)).
449. Id. at 545, 843 P.2d at 847.
450. 2003-NMCA-150, 82 P.3d 554.
451. Id.U 57-58, 82 P.3d at 569-70.
452. See id. M 57-58, 82 P.3d at 569-70; Fawcett, 114 N.M. at 546, 843 P.2d at 848.
453. Fawcett, 114 N.M. at 544-45, 843 P.2d at 846-47. CompareN.M. CONST. art. II, § 17 ("Every person
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and
no law shall
be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."), with U.S. CONST. amend. I
("Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.").
454. Fawcett, 114 N.M. at 544, 843 P.2d at 846 (citing Curry v. Journal Publ'g Co., 41 N.M. 318, 328, 68
P.2d 168, 174-75 (1937)).
455. Id. at 545, 843 P.2d at 847.
456. Id.
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A key difference in the text of the New Mexico Constitution's free speech
provision is the affumative grant of rights, as opposed to a restriction on government power, as found in the First Amendment.4" Article H,section 17 states, "Every
person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,""55 while
the First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press."459 Other state courts have interpreted similar language
from their state constitutions as being more expansive than the First Amendment."
Texas and Colorado are among the states that have similar free speech provisions46'
and have recognized broader protection for free speech under their state constitutions."
For example, the Texas Supreme Court in Davenport v. Garcia463 invalidated a
gag order that prohibited trial participants from speaking to the media about a case
involving toxic chemical exposure to children.' The court struck down the gag
order as a violation of the Texas Constitution's freedom of expression provision,
rather than the First Amendment." 5 The court declined to "limit the liberties of
Texans to those found in the Federal Constitution." ' In striking down the gag
order, the court in Davenport held that Texas's freedom of expression provision
provided greater rights thanits federal equivalent. 4 7 The court looked to the textual
differences between Texas's freedom of expression provision and the First
Amendment, noting that the framers of the Texas Constitution explicitly adopted
language distinct from the First Amendment and subsequently rejected a proposal
that would have put the language more in line with the First Amendment."
In conclusion, Davenport provides an example of a state constitution being
interpreted to provide broader protection than the First Amendment for freedom of
expression in the context of gag orders. The holding in Fawcett that article H,
section 17 offers greater protection than the First Amendment, at least in the context
of obscenity," 9 provides precedent from which it can be argued that New Mexico's

457. CompareN.M. CONST. art. I, § 17, with U.S. CONST. amend. I. In addition to text, some states recognize
other factors that aid in determining whether there is broader protection under a state constitution, including state
constitutional and common law history, preexisting state law, differences in structure between the federal and state
constitutions, and matters of particular state interest or local concern. Washington v. Gunwall, 740 P.2d 808, 812-13
(Wash. 1986) (en banc).
458. N.M. CONST. art. I, § 17.
459. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
460. Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs, 759 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1988); O'Quinn v. State Bar, 763 S.W.2d 397,
402 (Tex. 1988) (citing J.HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS 40 (1987)) (arguing that "positively phrased"
grants of rights in state constitutions, rather than restrictions on Congress's power in the federal constitution, are
more expansive and "offer a significant distinction upon which courts rely to construe their state constitutions").
461. TEx. CONST. art. I., § 8 states, "Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions
on any subject,.. .and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press." COLO. CONST.
art. H,§ 10 states, "[E]very person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject."
462: See Briggs, 759 S.W.2d at 944; People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Colo. 1989) (en banc).
463. 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992).
464. Id. at 6, 11.
465. Id. at 11.
466. Id.at 11-12. The court also found that the Texas Constitution had "independent vitality." Id.at 11.
467. Id. at 10.
468. Id. at 7-8. Early case law providing greater protection under the Texas Constitution served as a basis
for the court's holding. Id. at 8-9.
469. Fawcett, 114 N.M. at 546-47, 843 P.2d at 848-49..
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free speech provision provides greater protection in other contexts as well. The
textual language and the history ofNew Mexico's free speech provision also provide
support for this assertion.47 ° The fact that the New Mexico Supreme Court based its
ruling in Twohig on the New Mexico Constitution, rather than the First Amendment,47' is debatably an indication that the court viewed article II, section 17 as
broader, although the court did not explicitly state this. However, recognizing article
II, section 17 as providing greater protection would certainly fall in line with the
court's decision to characterize a trial participant gag order as a prior restraint,
triggering a heightened level of scrutiny and broad speech protection for trial
participants in New Mexico.472
VII. CONCLUSION
Twohig ensures that trial participant speech in New Mexico is well protected.
Under Twohig, there is a heavy burden to justify imposing a gag order on attorney
speech, if it is even necessary at all. Twohig provides clear requirements for trial
judges to follow in determining whether a gag order should be imposed on trial
participants. It follows then that trial participants also have clear guidelines as to
when their speech is properly gagged. Although the necessity of restricting attorney
speech through gag orders is questionable, it is unlikely that the use of gag orders
will end in the near future. Therefore, the duty remains with trial judges to undertake
the required critical analysis before imposing a gag order. The duty also falls on trial
participants, however, to serve as a check on trial judges by challenging gag orders
when the heavy burden against its constitutional validity is not overcome.

470. See supranotes 451-460 and accompanying text; Fawcett, 114 N.M. at 545, 843 P.2d at 847.
471. Twohig, 1996-NMSC-023, 1, 12, 918 P.2d at 333,335.
472. Id.1 13, 918 P.2d at 335-36.

